Great piece. Dr. Powell knows the history and strategy of China very well.
In November 2003, then Chinese President Hu Jintao warned that certain “major powers” were seeking to control the Strait of Malacca, and that China needed a new strategy to reduce this vulnerability.
I totally agree that China’s vulnerability to energy chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca has been significantly reduced by two decades of systematic preparation.
That said, there is also a broader issue. In this post, Dr. Powell mainly analyzes Malacca from the perspective of Persian Gulf oil flows into China. But the Strait of Malacca is not only an oil and gas corridor. It is also a crucial passage for Chinese manufactured goods, raw materials, components, container shipping, Southeast Asian supply chains, and the global maritime insurance system. This is where the deeper Malacca Dilemma lies for Chinese strategists.
Even if China has reduced the risk of an outright oil-supply cutoff through Russia, Central Asia, electrification, and strategic inventories, Malacca remains a wider trade and logistics chokepoint. A blockade or severe disruption of the strait would affect more than Middle Eastern oil. It would raise shipping costs, insurance premiums, delivery times, Southeast Asian supply-chain frictions, export logistics, and global trade uncertainty.
So while China has greatly reduced the fatality of Malacca as an energy chokepoint, it has not fully removed Malacca’s systemic importance as a trade chokepoint. That is why I am less optimistic than Dr. Powell.
The Malacca Dilemma has not disappeared. Its meaning has evolved. What China has really done over the past two decades is to use industrialization, electrification, oil inventories, overland energy corridors, and supply-chain coordination to convert a geopolitical chokepoint problem into a problem of system-switching capacity. China still has energy vulnerabilities, but it has downgraded them from the risk of being strangled to the challenge of high-cost adjustment.
But Dr Powell, you forget about the master strategist Don Tzu. No seriously, I think you've explained the situation better than anyone. It also seems that China's best strategy after all the measures taken that you have outlined above is to be patient and watch the US and the West generally destroy themselves militarily and economically, both in Russia and Iran. Since the Chinese know about patience better than almost any other country, with again Russia and Iran also knowing patience to a high degree. Donald Trump on the other hand has the patience of a gnat.
Your data on energy trajectories suggests that a blockade of the Strait of Malacca might now be a 20th-century solution to a 21st-century reality. In complex systems, the most resilient node is the one that minimizes its external dependencies through efficiency. If China has successfully decoupled its industrial growth from the volatility of oil shocks, then the 'Grand Strategy' of its rivals is effectively targeting a ghost. We are moving toward a world where 'power' is measured by energy autonomy rather than the ability to project force over distant flows. Is the West prepared for a world where its primary leverage, chokepoints, no longer chokes?
Another extremely interesting article, Dr. Powell, thank you very much!
During years I have been watching Brian Berletic in its YouTube channel "The New Atlas" explaining why he believes that the real intention of US bipartisan politicians is to strangle China. And on April 16th Richard Medhurst posted a video ("The Petrogas-Dollar: The Secret US Strategy Behind the Iran War") in his YouTube channel and Ryan Perkins published an article ("The Strait Logic: War on Iran is a Dress Rehearsal for Blockading China") in his Substack both with the same point of view.
I’ve seen them all. The point is that it’s not relevant what the “real” intentions are (assume they’re right - it’s always all about China); the next step is the critical one, and that’s the relationship of intentions and methods (the means-end calculus) to known realities. China lives rent free inside Washington’s head. But China and reality also get a say.
Great piece. Dr. Powell knows the history and strategy of China very well.
In November 2003, then Chinese President Hu Jintao warned that certain “major powers” were seeking to control the Strait of Malacca, and that China needed a new strategy to reduce this vulnerability.
I totally agree that China’s vulnerability to energy chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca has been significantly reduced by two decades of systematic preparation.
That said, there is also a broader issue. In this post, Dr. Powell mainly analyzes Malacca from the perspective of Persian Gulf oil flows into China. But the Strait of Malacca is not only an oil and gas corridor. It is also a crucial passage for Chinese manufactured goods, raw materials, components, container shipping, Southeast Asian supply chains, and the global maritime insurance system. This is where the deeper Malacca Dilemma lies for Chinese strategists.
Even if China has reduced the risk of an outright oil-supply cutoff through Russia, Central Asia, electrification, and strategic inventories, Malacca remains a wider trade and logistics chokepoint. A blockade or severe disruption of the strait would affect more than Middle Eastern oil. It would raise shipping costs, insurance premiums, delivery times, Southeast Asian supply-chain frictions, export logistics, and global trade uncertainty.
So while China has greatly reduced the fatality of Malacca as an energy chokepoint, it has not fully removed Malacca’s systemic importance as a trade chokepoint. That is why I am less optimistic than Dr. Powell.
The Malacca Dilemma has not disappeared. Its meaning has evolved. What China has really done over the past two decades is to use industrialization, electrification, oil inventories, overland energy corridors, and supply-chain coordination to convert a geopolitical chokepoint problem into a problem of system-switching capacity. China still has energy vulnerabilities, but it has downgraded them from the risk of being strangled to the challenge of high-cost adjustment.
As a general choke point question, it’s ultimately resolved militarily. We won’t be worried about trade flows in that case, it will be war.
Yes. Totally agree. That’s a different and very extreme scenario. Thank you Dr. Powell.
But Dr Powell, you forget about the master strategist Don Tzu. No seriously, I think you've explained the situation better than anyone. It also seems that China's best strategy after all the measures taken that you have outlined above is to be patient and watch the US and the West generally destroy themselves militarily and economically, both in Russia and Iran. Since the Chinese know about patience better than almost any other country, with again Russia and Iran also knowing patience to a high degree. Donald Trump on the other hand has the patience of a gnat.
.
Your data on energy trajectories suggests that a blockade of the Strait of Malacca might now be a 20th-century solution to a 21st-century reality. In complex systems, the most resilient node is the one that minimizes its external dependencies through efficiency. If China has successfully decoupled its industrial growth from the volatility of oil shocks, then the 'Grand Strategy' of its rivals is effectively targeting a ghost. We are moving toward a world where 'power' is measured by energy autonomy rather than the ability to project force over distant flows. Is the West prepared for a world where its primary leverage, chokepoints, no longer chokes?
Another extremely interesting article, Dr. Powell, thank you very much!
During years I have been watching Brian Berletic in its YouTube channel "The New Atlas" explaining why he believes that the real intention of US bipartisan politicians is to strangle China. And on April 16th Richard Medhurst posted a video ("The Petrogas-Dollar: The Secret US Strategy Behind the Iran War") in his YouTube channel and Ryan Perkins published an article ("The Strait Logic: War on Iran is a Dress Rehearsal for Blockading China") in his Substack both with the same point of view.
I honestly wish that you are 100% right.
All the best.
I’ve seen them all. The point is that it’s not relevant what the “real” intentions are (assume they’re right - it’s always all about China); the next step is the critical one, and that’s the relationship of intentions and methods (the means-end calculus) to known realities. China lives rent free inside Washington’s head. But China and reality also get a say.