The Great Entanglement
The European Sucker Punch that Ties the U.S. to European Security Forever
In the world of high politics and geopolitical theatre, perception often matters more than reality. And no one plays this theatre better than Donald Trump. Last week, Trump and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen emerged from a photo-op-heavy meet touting a raft of “historic” economic and security agreements. The U.S. President boasted about hundreds of billions in European investment, energy contracts, and arms purchases; a deal so one-sided it seemed Europe had simply surrendered its strategic autonomy to win over “daddy.”
But look beneath the bombast, and a different picture emerges. The picture is paradoxically not of European weakness per se (or vassalage as self-loathing Europeans would be tempted to say), but of European entrapment strategy from a position of relative weakness. If anything, this “deal” locks the United States deeper into Europe’s security and economic architecture, not the other way around. And it does so by using the one thing Trump cannot resist: the illusion of winning.
The Headline Commitments
The agreement, such as it is, consists of four key pillars:
15% Tariffs on EU Exports to the U.S., in exchange for the EU maintaining zero tariffs on U.S. imports;
$600 billion in European investment into the U.S;
“Hundreds of billions of dollars” in U.S. arms purchases; and
$750 billion in U.S. LNG imports over the next three years ($250B/year).
At first glance, this looks like geopolitical capitulation. But the math, and the logistics, tell a very different story.
LNG: Reality Begs to Differ
Let’s start with the most audacious number: $750 billion in LNG purchases over three years. In 2024, the EU imported roughly 45 billion cubic meters (bcm) of U.S. LNG, valued at about $16–19 billion. In the first half of 2025 alone, it took in another 46.5 bcm, on track for nearly 93 bcm for the full year; that’s roughly $33–39 billion, assuming market prices of $10–12/MMBtu.
In short, the EU would need to increase both volume and/or price more than six-fold to hit the $250 billion annual target. This is not remotely feasible. U.S. LNG export terminals and shipping capacity are already maxed out. European regasification infrastructure is stretched. There isn’t enough spare capacity, on either side of the Atlantic, to fulfil such an agreement.
And yet, the promise is now made. Von der Leyen knows that there’s no ability to deliver, so it was an easy promise to make.
What this means in practice is a long-term entrenchment of U.S.-EU energy trade. It binds American LNG exporters to European demand for years to come. It locks the U.S. energy sector into transatlantic logistics, financing and pricing dependencies, while simultaneously squeezing out other potential buyers (notably in Asia) and distracting Washington from developing a truly global energy strategy.
As for the Europeans, this situation will actually over time deliver it some leverage. In energy, dependence flows both ways. The risk for the EU is that these arrangements may discourage them from building energy partnerships outside the U.S. - from North Africa, Central Asia, or even China’s green hydrogen network.
Arms Purchases: A One-Way Security Guarantee
On the defence side, the EU’s pledge to buy “hundreds of billions of dollars” worth of U.S. military equipment further solidifies the transatlantic industrial complex. European NATO members are already ramping up defence spending, but funnelling this almost entirely into U.S. systems - F-35s, Patriot batteries and HIMARS - is not just a shopping decision. It’s a strategic lock-in.
By committing to U.S. arms, Europe ensures that America’s military-industrial base is deeply entwined with European budgets, politics and procurement cycles. Even if Trump, or any future president, wants to “get out of Europe,” the U.S. arms industry now has every reason to keep lobbying for Europe-focused policy. With billions on the table, security becomes a one-way guarantee: Europe pays, the U.S. stays. This is actually a ‘win’ for von der Leyen as much as it is for Trump.
At the same time, Europe avoids the hard work of building its own industrial base, or coordinating serious joint production initiatives. The incentive to pursue true strategic autonomy vanishes. That’s something of concern to many Europeans no doubt, but from von der Leyen’s point of view, this is a non-issue. Entangling the United States in European security priorities has been and remains the single most important objective for them.
Investment Smoke and Mirrors
Then there’s the mysterious $600 billion in European investment. There are no timelines; no mechanisms for execution or enforcement; and no sectors identified. Most likely, this “commitment” is little more than a repackaging of ongoing capital flows; that is, EU-based firms buying U.S. bonds, stocks or perhaps, setting up plants to avoid tariffs.
In truth, this is just the EU recycling dollar surpluses generated by its trade with the U.S. and other dollarised markets. There is no net new investment here. It is just political window dressing. But the hyperbolic effect is powerful. It creates the appearance of a transactional victory for Trump.
The similarities with the unravelling Japan “deal” are uncanny.
Tariffs: A Toothless Tool That Hurts America More
The opening headline about tariffs - 15% on EU goods exported to the U.S., with the EU committing to zero tariffs on U.S. goods - is largely irrelevant. Tariffs are paid by importers, not exporters. So the cost is borne by American consumers and businesses, not European producers.
Moreover, this tariff structure is roughly in line with what Trump has proposed across other trade partners. The fact that the EU gets no worse treatment than others is itself a small win; it preserves relative competitiveness. In other words, the EU gets to act like it conceded something, while losing nothing of consequence.
To the untrained eye, this looks like a textbook case of Trump’s signature “America First” strategy. In practice, however, it’s an economic own goal that accomplishes the opposite of its intent.
First, let’s not forget that tariffs are paid by importers, not exporters. When the U.S. imposes a 15% tariff on European goods, the cost is borne not by European producers, but by U.S. businesses and consumers. Importers must either absorb the cost or pass it along in the form of higher prices.
A 15% tariff on EU imports does not substantially change the relative cost competitiveness between Europe and the U.S. These are high-income, high-regulation economies where labor costs and productivity are already closely aligned. Slapping 15% on top of EU-origin goods may marginally affect profit margins, but it’s nowhere near the 30–40% cost advantage companies typically seek before reconsidering production locations.
In fact, the relative tariff regime now normalises European conditions with those applied to China, Mexico, and others under Trump’s worldview. The EU is not being uniquely penalised, just absorbed into a general matrix of across-the-board protectionism. That makes it, paradoxically, a win for Europe. Its goods are no less competitive than other global suppliers in the U.S. market.
More importantly, the tariff rate is a strategic miscalculation.
If Trump’s goal is to bring manufacturing back home, then 15% is too low to do it. But if the goal is to simply raise revenue (which in effect is a bleeding of liquidity from the American economy) and punish importers, then it's doing that, but at the cost of higher input prices for American producers and higher consumer prices across the board. That’s the worst of both worlds: it imposes frictional costs on the U.S. economy without achieving any structural shift in the geography of production.
Put plainly 15% is painful enough to hurt enterprises and households, but not painful enough to change production location decisions.
That leaves us with an awkward truth. Trump has locked in higher costs for Americans, while failing to create new incentives for reshoring or domestic investment. At best, this protects a few legacy sectors. At worst, it accelerates inflation, feeds supply chain inefficiency, and leaves American firms caught between rising input costs and stagnant consumer demand.
Meanwhile, Europe gets to look cooperative. The EU offers zero tariffs on U.S. goods, even though U.S. exports to the EU are dwarfed by European exports to the U.S., and even though many of the goods traded (e.g. aircraft, pharmaceuticals, financial services) are price-insensitive or governed by long-term contracts. So the net trade impact is minimal, while the political optics look generous.
Strategic Entrapment in Action
Zooming out, what emerges is a classic case of overcommitment as entrapment. Trump is being flattered, played and strategically tied down by a European elite that fully understands the transactional logic of the former (and possibly future) U.S. president.
By offering inflated figures, headline-making numbers, and “big wins,” the EU ensures that:
The U.S. defence industry is financially bound to Europe;
The U.S. energy sector is locked into Europe but with limited capacity to actually deliver on the stated numbers, which means European buyers are back on the market anyway;
The U.S. financial system continues to absorb European capital, which is only a function of persistent European trade surpluses vis-a-vis the US; and
Any attempt by the U.S. to reduce its European footprint would now come at an enormous domestic economic cost.
In effect, Europe has engineered strategic entanglement for the U.S. in European security affairs under the guise of submission. Trump thinks he’s winning, but the structural reality is that the U.S. is being burdened with more responsibility, more expectations and more economic exposure.
The Real Game: Multipolar Distraction
What’s most striking is how this “deal” pulls U.S. attention and capacity away from other critical theatres, notably the so-called Indo-Pacific. The resources needed to fulfill even a fraction of these European commitments will crowd out bandwidth for Taiwan, South Korea, the Red Sea, or the South China Sea. Put another way, the much-desired pivot to Asia is undermined by commitments to Europe.
Europe, often caricatured as geopolitically naive, is here acting with cold precision. If Trump wants a transactional world, Europe has just turned itself into the biggest transaction on the table, one so large it distracts Washington from other strategic priorities.
Europe’s Quiet Masterstroke
This is not, contrary to appearances, a simple story of European deference. It’s a quiet masterstroke of cunning from a position of relative political weakness. Von der Leyen has fed Trump the illusion of dominance while anchoring the U.S. firmly to the European project - militarily and politically.
And the beauty of it? None of it comes with any meaningful enforcement. That’s because none of it is actually real. The volumes can’t be delivered, the money won’t materialise in full, and the arms purchases will take decades. But the commitments have already reshaped expectations, lobbying dynamics and strategic planning.
Trump wanted to win. Europe gave him a victory so big it’s actually a trap.