Muddling our way to indivisible security?
The European Odyssey in the aftermath of defeat in Ukraine
The reactions to U.S. President Donald Trump’s phone call with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, and the remarks from US Secretary of Defence Peter Hegseth in relation to American perspectives on the state of the Ukraine war and its resolution, have been largely predictable. Some are implacably horrified and opposed, to a point of feeling betrayed. Others are jubilant and expectant. The latter are almost euphoric in their expectations or hopes that peace will come quickly. The former look to be gearing up to play spoiler.
For what it’s worth, my own sense is that while reality is clearly starting to sink in, there’s a long way to go between a phone call and a viable peace settlement. As they say, many a slip ‘twixt the cup and the lip.
‘The call’ and Hegseth’s realism
‘The Call’ - concession of defeat
Trump’s call to Putin appears to have taken many by surprise, especially those in Europe and Ukraine. Trump’s sidelining of the European leadership, NATO and Ukraine has been a shocking experience for them. Trump detailed the discussion by way of a social media post. Putin’s record of the conversation is by more conventional means: a read out on the Kremlin website. By way of summary:
Trump’s post featured general comments on a mutual desire for the bloodshed to end. Trump also indicated the members of the US negotiating team. (This did not include the Ukraine Peace Envoy, General Keith Kellogg.) The post also noted that the pair discussed a broad range of issues other than Ukraine.
The Kremlin readout recalled as follows, among other things: “Vladimir Putin pointed out it was necessary to eliminate the root causes of the conflict and agreed with Donald Trump in that a sustainable settlement could only be reached via peaceful negotiations.” (My emphasis)
This call was in effect a concession of defeat. Trump has wanted to wash his hands of the debacle as quickly as possible, for fear of become a co-owner of the strategic defeat, as I have argued elsewhere. That it was the US that made the call for peace speaks volumes as to the state of play on the battlefield now and expected to be into the future.
Hegseth’s realism
Meanwhile, Hegseth laid out an assessment of the state of play and American conditions going forward. In short, he made it clear that:
The US does not support Ukrainian membership of NATO. This has been the pivotal issue that has gnawed away at European security ever since Bush Junior opened the Pandora’s Box of Ukrainian membership of NATO in 2008.
The US does not believe that it is realistic for Ukraine to return to its pre-2014 borders (meaning Crimea is out of the question), and further that it is unrealistic to believe that the territories now controlled by Russia will be returned to Ukraine.
On the question of security guarantees, as part of a peace settlement:
The US will not commit any American troops to Ukraine as part of any potential future peacekeeping initiative. Interestingly, Hegseth made a pointed remark that any agreement had to hold, and could not become “Minsk 3.0”. This meant that any security guarantees had to be “backed by capable European and non-European troops.” This runs contra to Zalensky’s insistence that the US commits resources to any meaningful security guarantees.
Any peacekeeping forces that may be agreed would be European forces, and not deployed under the aegis of NATO and therefore not be covered by the article 5 protections that come with that. In other words, the US refuses to commit any resources to the provision of security guarantees to Ukraine.
NATO needs to ‘arm up’ and take responsibility for European security. The US has other priorities, specifically in relation to homeland security and its objective to contain China in Asia.
The US “remains committed to the NATO alliance and to the defense partnership with Europe. Full stop.” What that means in practice over the medium term is hard to tell.
The Reactions
Those who have been fully invested in what has been dubbed ‘Project Ukraine’ are aghast and confused. This includes various political leaders in Europe including the European Commission, NATO itself of course, and the sundry desiderata of media commentators and assorted analysts who’ve been telling the world for over two years that Ukraine was on the cusp of winning, that Russia was running out munitions and men and that the Russian economy was on the brink of collapse.
European NATO states are demanding that they be included in any negotiations. The so-called Weimar+ group of European nations has issued a statement in effect seeking to be invited to the negotiations. The Weimar+ Group comprises France, Germany, Poland, Italy, Spain, United-Kingdom, Ukraine, HRVP and the European Commission.
The EU’s foreign affairs boss Kaja Kallas has criticised Hegseth’s ‘realism’ as “appeasement”, warning that no deal can work without the backing of Europe and Ukraine. German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius has also decried the upfront concessions even before peace talks began. There are plenty of others, which can be easily found with the help of any search engine.
The Zalenksy regime has also been taken aback by the explicit sidelining of Ukraine in the proposed negotiations between the United States and the Russian Federation. Zalensky himself says there can be no peace deal without Ukraine’s involvement.
Part of the shock comes from a realisation that the US is actually accepting that the collective west has been defeated. This means not just NATO but the Americans as well. As well, the apoplexy comes from the realisation that the blame for the defeat is being sheathed home, well and truly, away from the United States of America and onto the laps of the Europeans and Ukrainians.
Others, mainly independent observers, academics and analysts who’ve long argued against continuation of the conflict in Ukraine, have responded with a level of relief and jubilation. Meanwhile, countries around the world are beginning to express their own opinions. China, for example, has welcomed the phone call between Trump and Putin, urging the parties to pursue dialogue and communication to resolve issues.
The Challenges
The frisson of excitement is sure to settle down, as the grind of addressing substantive issues confronts all concerned. I will touch on two challenges, though there are no doubt many others.
Terms and Nature of Settlement
Firstly, apropos the remarks of Hegseth about not being “Minsk 3.0”, the challenge will be whether the terms and nature of the settlement can bring the parties together in a lasting manner.
Terms
On the question of terms, the key is to note that Putin’s record of the phone call specifically singled out the need to address “root causes”. The root causes of the conflict go to the failure of the prevailing post-Cold War security architecture of Europe, not just to the ambitions of the collective west to expand NATO westward. Putin’s speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference is a clear statement of the issues and concerns - namely, what can now be called the “root causes”. This includes the presence of American bases and American artillery / missile bases in Europe, within striking distance of Russia, and a more general concern of the hegemonic role being played by mainly the United States in dictating the shape of things in international affairs. More locally, they also go to the presence of ideological elements in Ukrainian society, which the Russians view as an existential threat. Lastly, the Russians are clearly of the view that a militarised Ukraine is a risk that they cannot abide. When the Special Military Operation was launched in February 2022, Putin articulated key objectives:
The prevention of Ukraine from joining NATO (i.e., Ukrainian neutrality),
The demilitarisation of Ukraine, and
The de-nazification of Ukraine.
While Hegseth’s ‘realism’ has accepted the first point, there is less clarity around what the terms of a settlement might look like that could satisfactorily address the latter terms. Hegseth’s proposition on security guarantees involving European and non-European (but not American) troops in Ukraine would seem to be contrary to the second point. No-one in the collective west wants to go near the last, having now re-written history to pretend that Ukraine does not have a far-rightist problem even though until 2022, there was plenty of mainstream western media coverage about just such a problem.
In addition to the objectives articulated by Putin for the SMO, it is worth revisiting the two documents that Russia circulated on 17 December 2021. They were:
A draft treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States, and
A draft agreement between the Russian Federation and NATO.
These two documents were dismissed out of hand by the west at time. It is conceivable that they weren’t even read by the folk in Washington and Brussels. These two documents provide a clear framework for a renewed security architecture for western Europe, based on the principle of indivisible security, which would ensure the security of one isn’t at the expense of the security of others.
A satisfactory set of terms for the resolution of the conflict in Ukraine is likely to need to revisit the broader question of the European security architecture. These two documents need to be digested by the collective west.
Nature
Will a handshake deal between the US and Russian President be sufficient to bring the settlement to fruition? Extremely unlikely. Hegseth himself explains why, when he invokes the tragedy of the Minsk agreements as the negative exemplar. As is now well-known, the Minsk Agreements - despite being ratified by the UN Security Council - were never seriously implemented by the western powers. Rather, under the guise of the Agreements, the western powers bought time to arm and train to Ukraine with a view to engaging in war with Russia. Indeed, during Trump’s own first term, significant American resources were committed to building up the Ukrainian military.
The Russians are unlikely to be duped again.
What this means is that the nature of any settlement must take on a high level of guarantee - that of a treaty. It’s no surprise that Russia had circulated a draft treaty to the Americans in late 2021. Cynics may say that the US has a track record of ignoring treaties when it suits, and of course, that’s true. Be that as it may, however, there is no higher authority upon which the Russians could depend. A treaty requires 2/3 of voting US senators to vote in favour for it to be ratified, according to the Constitution. This is a high hurdle. Can Trump surmount this hurdle?
But a treaty with the US is unlikely to be sufficient either. Again, the Russian actions in late 2021 tell us that they believe that a separate agreement between the Russian Federation and NATO is also needed. After all, a treaty between Russia and the US does not legally bind NATO.
NATO out in the cold, but for how long?
Secondly, therefore, this brings us back to the question of NATO and Europe more broadly.
Hegseth has made clear the US position: the US will negotiate directly with Russia on the terms of a settlement and NATO will have to enforce those terms. As we have seen, the Europeans are pushing back (for now). (What a contrast to the NATO love-in in New York last year, pictured above.) Hegseth argues that European security is principally a responsibility for Europeans, repeating Trump’s frequently pushed point that most NATO members aren’t committing enough budget to the alliance. That said, the US remains “committed” to NATO.
Will the Europeans successfully force themselves to the negotiating table? Will the Europeans continue to call the US’ bluff and not in practice commit significant additional funding, almost daring the Americans to pull out of NATO? Whatever the dynamics, one does wonder whether entrusting the Europeans to ‘muscle up’ and take on enforcement responsibilities is likely to lend itself to a sustainable peace or, on the contrary, lay the ground for an intensified security dilemma in Europe. A militarised NATO is, writes Thomas Fazi, a risk to a permanent peace in Europe.
Herein lies the paradox at the heart of the Hegseth proposition. He wants to negotiate the peace and in effect extricate the US from the quagmire. He wants European nations to step up to the plate, and be the peace enforcer / guarantor. Yet, in doing so, he is inviting the NATO hawks to intensify militarisation that could undermine the peace settlement instead of securing it. Let’s not forget that the presence and modus operandi of NATO since the end of the Cold War has been the principal aggravation; one part of the “root causes” of the Ukraine imbroglio.
Put plainly, boosting NATO, even de facto, does not resolve ‘root causes’.
The Russians meanwhile can anticipate that if there’s a belief that the Europeans are to play such as role, then an agreement between Russia and NATO will also be necessary. Russia will drag the Europeans to the table, when it suits, perhaps with a view to emasculating NATO on the tail-end of the defeat on the steppes of Ukraine.
Putin has spoken of the need to address western European security in the wider context of Eurasian security. At a speech to senior staff of the Russian Foreign Ministry on June 14, 2024 he said:
… it is crucial to recognise that the future security architecture should be open to all Eurasian countries that wish to participate in its creation. ‘For all’ includes European and NATO countries as well. We share the same continent, and we must live and work together regardless of the circumstances. Geography cannot be changed.
He has contemplated that such a process could take up to 15-20 years to fully work through and unfold. He has spoken of a ‘security club’ for Eurasia, with the agreement of China’s president Xi. This extends the principles of indivisible security through to east and south east Asia. It would not be surprising if negotiations drag on, as the flavour of the pill for the collective west becomes increasingly bitter. Putin clearly is willing to countenance negotiations with the US. At some point, however, it is likely that he will insist on an agreement with NATO as well.
Why would Russia stop short? This is a window of opportunity of a generation for Russia to push hard to progress a new architecture; the kind of architecture that they have been flagging for many years and which was ignored summarily by the collective west when details were floated on the cusp of the SMO. The EU and NATO are at their weakest now; and frankly, so are the Americans. It would be surprising if the Russians did not appreciate how this situation enhances the opportunity to reshape the relationship between Russia and NATO (as distinct from Russia and the US). For Russia, this would involve a weakened NATO, which is contrary to Hegseth’s ostensible objective.
Given their preponderance on the battle field, Russia won’t be bullied into a rushed decision. They can fight on for a long time to come, if need be. Meanwhile, Trump will be wondering how he can fast track the US’ extrication from the quagmire, blame others for the debacle, and hopefully grab some rare earths on the way out.