Ishiba to test Washington and Asia
New and old challenges in a time of turbulence
Shigeru Ishiba has, after four previous failed attempts, reached the pinnacle of his nation's political system, becoming Japan’s new Prime Minister. At 67 he is certainly not a young man, but in this day and age, he is by no means to be considered too old for the job. He is an experienced if not a steady hand, having a history of clashing with party colleagues and pushing the political envelope on contentious issues.
Within the spectrum of Japanese conservative politics, the new Prime Minister could reasonably be described as a defence hawk. He will also bring a possible shake up to Japanese economic policy. In the arena of defence he is likely to seek to exploit relative weakness in America’s status in Asia and continue to expand Japanese militarism, while addressing issues such as the changing dynamics on the Korean Peninsula and evolving tensions across the Taiwan Straits and in the South China Sea.
The United States has in recent years confronted a reality of a diminished presence in Asia, with its historic preponderance under serious question. In the face of what the US sees as the rising strategic threat of the People's Republic of China, the US has had little choice but to enlist regional client states, subimperial allies and former colonies in the name of containing a rising China. Japan is party to this new strategy premised on the creation of a web or network of minilateral organisations.
Japan is a member of the QUAD, an organisation that was actually a brainchild of a former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The QUAD involves the United States, India, Australia and Japan. Additionally, Japan recently joined a three party minilateral involving the United States and the Philippines. Furthermore, Japan is sounding out the prospects of becoming a member of the AUKUS arrangement, which presently comprises the United States, the UK and Australia.
These minilateral alliances speak to a United States that has had to reach out to its alliance partners to fill the gap of military capability that the Americans are finding difficult to do by themselves. Whilst US national security doctrine continues to define American interests as interests across the entire globe, historically enabled through the expanded network of military bases and globally leading defence budget expropriations, the United States is now confronting a reality in which its capacity is stretched thin. Despite spending a little more than $16 trillion on defence between 2001 and 2023, the Americans are no longer in a position to fight what they describe as a two war strategy, let alone prevail in a three war environment. Rather, the recent experiences of the war in Ukraine and the unfolding conflict in West Asia, all point to a chronic limitation in American military capability. According to a Washington ‘hawk’, Hal Brands, despite the massive amount of funding the American military is ‘falling behind’.
If warfare is a system versus system question, then it is becoming increasingly clear that the United States, and the collective west more broadly, is confronting a reality in which it is being found wanting across all key system dimensions.
Firstly, in terms of military doctrine, the conflict in Ukraine has shown that the Russians are more than a match for NATO systems, methodologies and tactical approaches.
Secondly, the conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated that the western military industrial system does not have the capacity to match the productive output of Russia let alone anyone else in the world. The western military industrial system is struggling to produce sufficient equipment and armaments to successfully prosecute a war of attrition or a conflict with a genuine peer.
Thirdly, as much as modern warfare is significantly mechanised, in certain circumstances such as a war of attrition on the steps of Ukraine, the availability of suitably skilled and experienced personnel is a necessity for not only successful defence but successful offence. In terms of personnel it is clear that the collective west is suffering from a shortage of suitably skilled personnel, a problem which is compounded by the challenges that western nations have had in recruiting for their defence forces. The US’ draft of young men turning 18 has plummeted by 33% between 2020 an 2023, from 60% to 40%.
Lastly, successful warfare presupposes a capacity to replenish, repair and replace that which has been committed and lost on the front line. These supply chain systems go to the extent to which logistics capabilities can be rolled out to ensure the front line is sufficiently equipped.
The American bluewater navy has also been progressively degraded in relative terms, beset by production and maintenance problems not to mention the shortage of skilled personnel. Furthermore, changing technologies - in relation to, for example, the ability to detect and intercede adversary missiles, and the expanded role of unmanned capabilities, including so-called suicide drones – have exposed traditional American bluewater navy platforms to vulnerabilities that historically would not have been countenanced. But, perhaps the most significant game changer, for want of a better term, is the development of hypersonic missile technologies by both the Russians and the Chinese. These technologies in effect enable the Chinese to reach beyond the so-called first island chain. Furthermore, China and Russia’s growing cooperation could potentially provide the Chinese with access to Russian naval port infrastructure on the Kamchatka Peninsula. The Kamchatka Peninsula enables direct access to the Pacific Ocean.
Against this backdrop, Japan has in the past decade sought to exploit gaps in which it could incrementally expand its military prowess and pursue a strategy that would deliver it greater autonomy within the region. In doing so, Japan is treading carefully. It can ill-afford to get the Americans totally offside, and while US presence in Japan and in Asia is seen by Japan’s defence establishment as a necessity, there’s little doubt that there remains a wellspring of Japanese nationalism that seeks to reassert a more potent role for Japan within the security architecture of Asia.
The weaker America is by Japan’s estimate the more assertive Japan becomes. The post war settlement of American protection coupled with the realities of post nuclear devastation and a reluctance-cum-constitutional constraint to pursue regional military expansion is slowly giving way. Nationalist sentiments remain active in the Japanese body politic. Subordination to the U.S. forever is an unpalatable scenario.
Ishiba can be expected to test the tolerances of the US even further. He has long seen the Japan-US relationship as asymmetric, and wants to push towards what he would see as greater parity and enhancing Japanese independence. In a recent Hudson Institute interview, Ishiba argued:
It is my mission to raise the Japan-US alliance to the level of the US-UK alliance. To achieve this, Japan must have its own military strategy and become independent in terms of security until it is willing to share its own strategy and tactics on equal terms with the US.
He might not have the nature of the US-UK alliance right, but his support for an Asian NATO may find some welcoming ears inside the Beltway (and perhaps in Brussels too), but there will be those who will treat this proposal with a certain degree of cautionary concern - and even alarm. The issue isn’t American desire to contain China, but whether the creation of additional institutions like an Asian NATO can actually contribute to the revitalisation of American Primacy in Asia or undermine it. After all, Ishiba’s proposal is framed to support his view and advance his aim that the US-Japan relationship should be one between ‘ordinary nations’.
He proposes that the US-Japan security treaty be revisited, so that:
Japan takes joint command over US troops stationed in Japan;
Japanese troops be stationed on Guam, a US territory; and
The Japanese presence on Guam would be governed by the same extraterritorial privileges granted to American troops in Japan ie., the Japanese troops would not be subject to American law.
He couches these proposals in terms of sharing burden and enhancing mutual deterrence, though it is beyond credulity that anyone in Washington would take them at face value, let alone accede to them.
Other countries in Asia will be wary of a proposal like an Asian NATO too, concerned that it would not only undermine ASEAN Centrality but also exacerbate regional tensions. Ishiba’s support for an Asian NATO is unlikely to extend to the majority of Japan’s regional neighbours in North and South East Asia. The Jakarta Times has editorialised against the proposal, as has China’s Global Times. The proposition also failed to gain any traction at the recent ASEAN meeting, in October 2024. Furthermore, one wonders what the Republic of Korea, and China for that matter, would think of Ishiba’s proposal for Japan to share in American nuclear weapons capabilities. In any case, it’s inconceivable that the Americans would ever countenance such as ‘sharing’ proposition.
With this proposal, in addition to alarming nations across South East Asia, Ishiba has the potential to realise a ‘trifecta’ of rocking relations with the US, ROK and China all in one move.
That said, it could be argued that Ishiba’s Asia NATO proposition is a case of kite flying; to test the waters and push the envelope. The notion also plays well to a domestic audience, particularly within the ruling party. It is inconceivable that Ishiba would not have known that the proposition wouldn’t fly with key regional stakeholders and allies in Washington, so aside from domestic considerations the rationale for advancing the Asia NATO proposition seems to be about expanding the envelope for Japan’s own regional ambitions as a regional power, out from the shadows of the United States.
Ishiba’s elevation to the pinnacle of Japan’s political system comes at a time of extensive regional flux. His long-held political ambitions to reassert Japan’s standing as a regional power will challenge not only the expectations those in Washington have of Japan, but also further rattle a region that is seeking to navigate beyond the dynamics of great power competition.
Countries across Asia and Washington will be wary, but for different reasons.