On 8 May 2026, I published an essay that examined in detail the extent to which the war against Iran is enabling the US to dominate the global energy market. My conclusion at the time was a straightforward “no.”
This very brief note updates some key data points from May through early August 2026 and wonders whether the situation has changed.
It hasn’t.
Claims about dominating global energy must be tested against the extent to which U.S. crude oil, diesel and LNG exports dominate the global market. It is mainly market share that delivers capacity to control flows and prices.
Crude oil
U.S. crude exports averaged roughly 4–5.5 mb/d over the May-August period, with a peak near 5.6–5.7 mb/d in May before moderating. Relative to the non-U.S. global liquids market (approximately 83–85 mb/d), this equates to a share of about 4.5–6.5%. Rising prices have incentivised expanded production in the U.S. as well as draw-downs from the strategic petroleum reserve. This will have longer term thermoeconomic implications as the divergence between exchange value and use value sharpens, as I have discussed previously.
Diesel / distillate
Exports of diesel / distillates have been at elevated levels over the past 100 days or so, frequently 1.5–1.9 mb/d (with weekly records near 1.9 mb/d). Against a rest-of-world diesel / distillate market of roughly 24.5–25.5 mb/d, the U.S. share stands in the 6–8% range during the high-export weeks and closer to 5–6% on a broader average.
LNG
The United States remained the largest single exporter of LNG. In 2025 it held roughly 25–26% of global LNG trade. In the disrupted 2026 environment (with Qatari volumes constrained by Hormuz), monthly data show the U.S. share of global LNG supply rising further into the low-to-mid 30% range at times. This is the one area where the U.S. share is materially higher, reflecting both capacity growth and the temporary absence of Middle Eastern volumes. Even so, it remains one of several major suppliers rather than a controlling monopoly. Dominance of American supplies vis-a-vis Europe is arguably present, but this does not mean global dominance in this sector overall.
It must be noted that this notwithstanding, LNG remains a relatively small slice of the overall global oil-and-gas complex. In 2025, global LNG trade reached a record ~437 million tonnes (roughly 590–600 bcm). That volume met only about 12–13% of total world natural gas demand. Natural gas itself accounts for roughly 23% of global primary energy consumption, so LNG equates to only around 3% of total primary energy supply.
Even with the United States holding 25–32% of the LNG market in the recent period, its absolute contribution to the broader oil-and-gas system is modest.
Conclusion
Across crude and diesel, U.S. export shares of the non-U.S. market continue to fall in the 4–8% band. This confirms the earlier assessment: the United States functions as a flexible swing supplier capable of influencing prices and availability at the margin, particularly when other sources are disrupted. It does not constitute market dominance.
At the same time, China’s role as the principal swing buyer has become more evident. Its ability to sharply reduce crude imports (drawing on large inventories) during the 2026 supply shocks demonstrably moderated price spikes. Demand-side flexibility of that scale is a material counterweight to any single supplier’s influence.
The U.S. can act as a meaningful swing supplier in specific segments (especially LNG when Middle Eastern volumes are constrained), but it does not dominate the overall hydrocarbon market. LNG is actually a fairly small part of the total global hydrocarbon market.
The overall picture — discussed in early May 2026 — of a multipolar energy market, rather than U.S. dominance, stands.
Ah, yes, U.S. is not a major producer, and China being the largest importer sets the prices, *BUT* it is the goal of U.S. Hegemony to decide who can buy and who can sell oil and gas, and who is allowed to have a supply of energy. Now team that thought up with Bessent's apparent goal of shorting China's CNH this autumn, and you see the ultimate energy-control theme - this entire Iran war is simply a set-up to damage China. See this one:
https://ceinewsletter.substack.com/p/the-rope-thickens-shorts-sanctions
The Rope Thickens: Shorts, Sanctions, the Yen Rescue, the Strait That Isn’t Reopening, and a Message to the Markets - A Petroyuan Trap August Update - RYAN PERKINS - AUG 12, 2026
Yet another of the myths about America deflates, and in this case leaves a bad smell. The US is not self-sufficient in petroleum. For example, it imports over 4m bpd of heavy crude from Canada. This is vital to keeping American trucks on the road and planes in the air.
Even using capitals doesn't capture the depth and breadth of the global Petroleum Complex. Within it, as the author points out, the US is a marginal player, not a monopoly. Of course, the US has the financial resources to heavily influence the market. However the critical importance of petroleum means that the world has sought out sources everywhere it can. No one producer is dominant.
But I don't want to seem like a Negative Norman. Along with depleting its petroleum reserve as if there's no tomorrow, the USA is showing so much confidence in its finances that it's buying back its long-term debt with short-term money borrowed today. Take that BRICS!