Asia Pacific Security
Interview with Global Times around the Shangri-La Summit (May-June 24)
The Shangri-La Security Summit was held on 31 May - 2 June 2024, in Singapore. I did an interview with Global Times in the lead up to the event. The full transcript is provided below, ‘as is’. The issues remain of continued relevance, and I hope my commentary and observations at the time pass the test of time, and help us understand what’s at stake.
GT: What do you think is the greatest security challenge currently facing the Indo-Pacific region?
Powell:
The greatest challenge to Indo-Pacific regional stability and peace is the US’ desire to pursue a strategy aimed at either resurrecting or maintaining US primacy. It’s either resurrecting US primacy if you believe it is already gone, or seeking to hold on to primacy if you believe it still exists. The more the US seeks to pursue primacy, the more likely it is to destabilise the region and disrupt the ability of the regional countries and peoples to pursue their own style of regional peace and economic development.
For example, the US has, over the course of the last three years or so, instigated a range of very provocative military initiatives built around localised alliances, or minilaterals. These initiatives are fairly and squarely aimed at containing China from the point of view of the US. At the same time, the US is mobilizing its historic network of client states, former colonies and sub-imperial allies to bolster its position not only in Asia but also in the broader Pacific, which is a region the US called, after World War II, America’s Lake.
We are seeing the formation of many small groups – AUKUS, Quad, or the new Squad, which will include the Philippines, Japan and the US. The creation of micro-institutions is destabilizing.
Many scholars in international relations and security discourse argue that creating such blocs during times of peace is antithetical to the pursuit of peace. This is because such blocs need a rationale, a reason for existence, which presupposes conflict. These blocs need conflict to remain relevant. That is one of the main dangers of the approach that the US has taken within this region.
GT: What do you expect from possible meeting between China-US defense chiefs?
Powell:
As Winston Churchill once said, “Jaw-jaw is better than war-war”. So, the opportunity for relevant senior decision-makers to have discussions with each other should be welcomed.
Parties keeping channels of communication open, no matter how tense the relationships are, is key to maintaining a stable, predictable, and hopefully sustainable, peaceful environment. So, the fact that the parties are going to engage in discussion is a good practical step forward. However, the concern that many people will increasingly have is America’s sincerity deficit. Over the past 10, or even 15 years, the US has undertaken a number of actions in different parts of the world that raise serious questions about the credibility of its undertakings. The actions pursued by the US in relation to NATO’s expansion eastwards, and ultimately its interventions in the situation in Ukraine, have raised serious doubts about whether the US does what it says. Sadly, there is an increasing perception, based on its track record, that the US says one thing and does another. This will raise concerns among both the immediate parties to the discussions and observers within the region about whether the American statements will be believable and credible.
It can be tempting to throw your hands in the air and say, ‘This is a waste of effort’; when one side says one thing and does another. However, I think that the responsible course of action is to keep channels of communication open and at least be willing to hear what others have to say.
Countries will reach their own judgments based on the track record of those involved as to whether their words are sincere. We can hope that with the passage of time, the lack of sincerity that we have seen in the recent past will fade away as new realities begin to shape actual American public policy behaviour.
The problem we have at the moment is that the US policy elite are experiencing severe displacement anxiety. The world has changed in a way that means the US no longer holds the unilateral, unipolar position it enjoyed for the past 30 years. Adapting to this change is clearly challenging for the policy institutions and the political elite. In some respects, the US policy elites are going through grief. They have lost the thing they cherished most, which is the unipolar Pax-Americana leadership position. When people go through grief, they first experience anger and denial. However, at some point, the reality of the situation demands that these people begin a process of negotiating their relationship with the new reality.
I hope that through ongoing dialogue, they are able to see that the world has changed, and it doesn’t mean that there are threats everywhere to the US. In fact, even though the US no longer occupies the unquestioned unipolar position, it can and will nonetheless play a substantial role in world affairs. I hope that’s what will happen over the next four or five years.
GT: So China is showing responsibility for keeping communication with the US, despite US sincerity deficit, right?
Powell:
Absolutely. After the experiences of the meeting in Anchorage at the beginning of President Biden’s term, the Chinese side, in response to some very unusual or unconventional opening remarks from the Americans, actually veered off script and put their cards on the table. This made it very clear to the Americans that the world has changed, and China, among other countries, will not accept the behaviour that historically came from a unipolar hegemon. But the door is always open for working together to build a better world for the future. That is the responsible thing to do.
We can hope that Americans also understand that their interests are best served when these two big countries find common ground on critical areas such as climate change, energy transition and creating meaningful employment in an era of significant technological disruption.
GT: Taiwan is often one of the top topics at the Shangri-La Dialogue. It is brought up every year, often with the tone of China being a ‘threat’; Is it reasonable that the issue of territorial sovereignty and core interests of China is always sensationalised at international security forums?
Powell:
There are two issues at stake here. The first one concerns the legal or de jure status of Taiwan, both globally within the United Nations framework and from the perspective of the warring parties in the Chinese civil war. That’s the first thing. The second thing is that despite the de jure recognition of a single China, which the island of Taiwan is a part of, there are clearly political forces in the world seeking to portray the situation quite differently.
The idea of two Chinas will not happen. I don’t think anybody on either side of the Taiwan Straits wants to have a war. In practical terms, the options are maintaining the status quo or finding a pathway to peaceful reunification. Leaders and citizens of the island of Taiwan must carefully consider these choices, as should countries in the region. A peaceful resolution to the civil war is actually in the interests of everybody in the region.
I hope both the Americans and Beijing can understand that Lai Ching-te has acted with a high degree of naivety. With time, he will realise that leadership doesn’t permit reckless actions endangering people’s security, for which he is responsible. A leader’s primary duty is ensuring the safety and well-being of those they’re responsible for. If one cannot do that he failed the first test. Lai also arguably violated a constitutional test. The constitution of the ROC, which covers the area of Taiwan, strictly opposes the notion of two Chinas. In flagging this idea of two Chinas, Lai was undermining the provisions of the constitution that he claims he swears allegiance to.
The real question for American political leadership is, do they want a war? This needs clarification. If they don’t want a war, they have to give up on the idea of a war for reunification and the idea that there can ever be two Chinas. It means that Americans need to work towards a peaceful resolution of the cross-Strait question, a commitment made four decades ago, and actually play a constructive role in achieving that outcome, as opposed to constantly stymying the pathway towards peaceful reunification.
GT: do you think that the turmoil in Ukraine and the Middle East could occur in Asia?
Powell:
The conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East are clearly impacting the resources that the collective West is able to mobilise. It also indicates that, from a systemic perspective, the collective West no longer prevails in terms of personnel, doctrine, equipment or the supply chains necessary for equipment replacement and repair. The conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have revealed severe limitations within the West.
What’s important to consider regarding the Asia region? The real message from the Ukraine experience is for the people of the Asian region in general, not just for people living on Taiwan.
The collective West, particularly the neoconservatives within its political setup, mainly originating from the US, pursued a strategy in Ukraine that they are now applying in Asia. This strategy has several key components. It targets an adversary with the aim of breaking it up, disrupting it, and if possible, effecting regime change. The neoconservatives have tried that in relation to Russia by expanding NATO eastward, instigating colour revolutions, destabilising Russia’s periphery, and interfering in its domestic politics by supporting opposition forces.
These are the kinds of strategies that have been replicated in Asia. The efforts of the US and the CIA, in particular, to create disruptions in Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, the Philippines, and across the Straits, echo the strategies used in Georgia, Ukraine, and other parts of Europe, going all the way back to Yugoslavia.
The aim of the neoconservatives is not to facilitate peace within regions but to stir up divisions for their own benefit. This has been the case in Ukraine since 2014, where the collective West has supplied Ukraine with new munitions and training to strengthen its army against Russia.
Similarly, in our region here in Asia, the US has breached agreements with the China by continuing to supply arms to the island of Taiwan. Additionally, it has recently established militarised, unilateral arrangements that could trigger a new arms race in the region, marked by the deployment of mid-range missiles.
What’s been happening in Europe is not so much about sending signals regarding whether Ukraine wins or loses. It’s more about understanding the game plan and what’s at stake. What’s occurred in Europe is a game plan focused on dividing and conquering to create instability and militarise regions, allowing the Americans to step in and exploit divisions for their own interests.
And they are repeating the same strategy in Asia.
GT: Now, the West is portraying China as a ‘bully’; in the region. In your opinion, is China a bully or a force for peace?
Powell:
The most obvious example is China’s role in resolving deep-seated conflicts in the Middle East, notably by facilitating a historic détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
The Chinese approach, as exemplified in the Saudi Arabia-Iran situation, is to build or facilitate détente by encouraging the parties to reach consensus and have ownership of the solution. This contrasts with the collective West’s approach, which is imposing a solution and enforcing it with arms.
GT: What about in the Asia-Pacific region?
Powell:
Some Western perspectives underestimate the capacity of all the countries in the region. The fact is that these countries and their people have coexisted with China for centuries, and they better understand how to interact with their neighbours, both big and small, than the Americans, who have been involved in the region for only the past 200 years.
China has land borders with several countries and shared maritime interests with many others.
For millennia, their interactions have largely avoided deep long wars. While some conflicts are inevitable, entrenched warfare has not been typical in the interactions between China and its neighbours.
The Americans are doing a great disservice to the peoples, cultures and communities of Asia when they suggest that these countries are too small and don’t know how to deal with China.
That’s nonsense. They have known for centuries how to manage their relationships. One of the ways used today is through institutions like ASEAN and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the world’s largest free trade agreement, involving 15 countries including the 10 ASEAN members, and China, Japan, Korea, New Zealand and Australia.
It is a feat of diplomacy that the Americans can only marvel at and scratch their heads over. They don’t know how to pull together consensus-driven programs like this because they haven’t had to do it for decades.
Asian countries, through multipolar institutions like ASEAN, have demonstrated their ability to address regional issues effectively. These approaches work for the region because they respect the histories involved and draw on the lessons of those histories to find new solutions going forward.
GT: To provide regional security, should the US leave the region alone?
Powell:
Leaving it alone is one thing, there’s more – the US could learn something from Asia. The US can watch, observe and take on board the lessons of centuries of pragmatic statecraft in Asia and realise there is another way.
This alternative approach is necessary when dealing with an emerging multipolar world. In a multipolar environment, unless we want conflicts everywhere all the time, it is imperative that states rediscover or amplify their abilities in statecraft to find common solutions and build win-win outcomes that mesh each other’s security and prosperity interests.
The US could learn something from that.
GT: The voices of the Global South are increasingly prominent on the global stage. However, at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Western voices still overwhelmingly dominate. Do you think this situation will change in the future?
Powell:
Unfortunately, at this current juncture in world history, the collective West has boxed themselves into a corner. It has done this by raising the stakes in terms of democracy versus autocracy, turning the conflict in Ukraine into an existential crisis rather than a localised, manageable conflict. In this environment, the collective West still has some years to go before it meaningfully engages with a changed world. The process of change involves experiences of grief, anger and denial before reaching negotiation.
From the point of view of the global majority or the Global South, we need to be patient and empathetic. Ironically, we must recognise that the global hegemon is undergoing a deep process of grief. We need to reach out and help them understand that the world isn’t coming to an end and that there are many opportunities for collaborative actions in a new multipolar environment that could deliver tremendous outcomes for their peoples. China has, for many decades now, shown that it knows the value of patience.
The third point is that the Shangri-La Dialogue is also a creature of history. It emerged in a time when the countries of the Global South were voiceless. Questions of security, even in the Asia region and the Asia-Pacific more broadly, bore the marks of centuries of colonialism. Security in Asia was a question for colonial powers to come and talk about how they would maintain security in a region far from their own homes and how they would teach the locals about security.
However, the world has changed, and I hope the Shangri-La Dialogue will respond to these changes and evolve accordingly. There needs to be a place at the table for the countries of the global majority. These countries should not just be on the menu at the whim of one country.
They should have a rightful seat at the table to contribute to the dialogue. The Shangri-La Dialogue, in many ways, reflects the circumstances of its origin and now faces a new set of circumstances to which it must adapt.