Context: I have been working on an extended body of work focused on developing the foundations of an integrated theoretical framework for the political economy of thermodynamics, information and money. But, events last week at the Shangri-La Security Summit, an annual high-level conference hosted in Singapore, called for an immediate reflection on questions of security in Asia instead. This is a rather long piece, which explores one possible scenario of how an ‘Asian rupture’ - in Walter Benjamin’s sense - could take place and unfold. The political economy work will just have to wait a bit longer.
Washington has China on its brain. It is increasingly explicit and provocative. A bipartisan consensus has coalesced and ossified on Capitol Hill around the Manichaean idea that the U.S. confronts an ‘end of days’ struggle between good and evil. China is the evil ‘other’. Yet, American belligerence and intensified rhetoric comes at a time when the U.S. is actually at its weakest. Behind the facade of intensified rhetoric and demands of allies in Asia to step up to confront the so-called ‘China threat’ is an opening - a moment of potential rupture - in which the entire security architecture of Asia can be reconfigured - without a shot fired. This essay explores just such a scenario.
The U.S.: War and Belligerence ‘r’ Us
American Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth beats the drums of war behind a facade of “peace through strength”. He uses slippery rhetoric to accuse China of what the U.S. itself has been doing for years; not just in Asia but across the globe. From the platform of the Shangri-La Security Summit he issued a warning of the "real and potentially imminent" threat from China, and a clarion call for allies to increase their military spending. Notice the qualifier “potentially”, which is added to provide rhetoric wriggle room. His claims are evidence-free, premised on claims of China’s preparation for war by 2027 which were, in fact, assertions originally made by an American Admiral, Phil Davidson. This became known as the ‘Davidson Window’, and Washington has been obsessed by it ever since.
Not long ago, Hegseth signed off on an internal DoD memo that makes clear the Pentagon’s sole focus is to be China. China is described as the “sole pacing threat”, with the principal objective being “deterring China’s seizure of Taiwan”. This is a defence secretary prosecuting a continuation of longstanding U.S. doctrine, concretised in the 1992 US Defence Planning Guidance and known widely as the Wolfowitz Doctrine, which is to assert primacy in all quarters and more precisely, in current times, to contain China (see Brand for a discussion from an American point of view).
Hegseth isn’t alone. He’s clearly no more than one member of a conga line.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio speaks of China as America’s most significant adversary - it’s “greatest threat”, and recently announced an “aggressive” revocation of student visas of Chinese students in America in what is clearly a racialised attack. Paranoia and hostility towards China is such that the U.S. is incapable of distinguishing between risk and race. There are harbingers to the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, though we don’t need to over-stretch the parallels at this moment.
Senator Lindsey Graham threatens tariffs of 500% on China should it continue to buy oil from Russia. These are “bone breaking sanctions” that, according to Graham, have the support from 82 senators that aim to deliver a massive blow on the Russian economy by threatening its major trade partners. Given how the tariff war has so far played out, Graham’s enthusiasm and extremism is matched only by his detachment from the sacramental order of reality. That said, given this threat one wonders why Beijing would be in any hurry to arrive at a negotiated resolution to the tariffs imbroglio when it’s clear that there are major risks that whatever detente is agreed will be undermined by actions from Capitol Hill. No wonder US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent bemoans the talks stalling.
Speaking of Bessent, let it not go unremarked that he has tried to isolate China in an ill-conceived assault on the trade front, off the back of President Trump’s “Liberation Day” pronouncements and subsequent backdowns. Bessent had what has been described as a “grand encirclement plan”. The U.S. continues to intensify prohibitions on high tech exports to China, sanctioning more Chinese entities. Unsurprisingly, China has begun to respond with surgical precision akin to the deployment of an acupuncture needle. Bessent now bloviates that China’s refusal to lift restrictions on exports of rare earth elements represents a breach of an agreement that appears nowhere in the joint statement that emerged after talks on the banks of Lake Geneva. The materiality of these restrictions are incredibly significant and should not be underestimated as I have argued elsewhere; Bessent’s reaction speaks of an emergent anxiety and - perhaps even - panic.
Meanwhile, the U.S. plies allies in Asia with arms and badgers others to up their military spending. The U.S. is implementing the same playbook as it has done in Europe; it actively provokes and destabilises; it builds up arms while accusing others of preparing for war; and it pushes others to the frontline to do the dirty work and suffer the casualties. Ukraine is the best ever investment, according to Graham, because it churned money for the defence contracting sector, weakened Russia (dubious American fantasy in the face of evidence to the contrary), and didn’t see one America killed in combat.
The U.S. has pulled the strings. It promises the world to erstwhile allies (let’s call them proxies), but when the going gets tough and defeat is inevitable, the U.S. begins to backtrack. It cuts and runs. It has been forever thus, ever since the calamitous and humiliating retreat from Saigon to the rabble escaping Kabul. And let’s not forget what the disastrous Red Sea escapade has demonstrated: the much-vaunted US navy armed to the teeth with the latest high tech weaponry we’re bested by the Houthis. American inventories are depleting, exposing severe limitations, and replenishment rates can’t compensate.
This playbook is being used in Asia. While it quietly retrenches its frontline exposure - the U.S. is quietly pulling troops out of Okinawa and the Republic of Korea, and its material capabilities have been exposed as inadequate and insufficient - it presses others to do Washington’s bidding.
The U.S. has troops on Taiwan in contravention of its historic undertakings. US special forces troops are permanently deployed in Kinmen Island, 10km from the Chinese mainland. It supplies arms to the forces on Taiwan. The US has long officially refused to confirm troop deployments on Taiwan - having agreed in 1979 to withdraw troops from the island - but retired Navy Admiral Mark Montgomery has let the cat out of the bag. In testimony to a congressional committee hearing, he confirmed that the US has 500 troops stationed on Taiwan, declaring that this was insufficient in number. He went to to claims:
“It needs to be a thousand. … If we are going to give them billions of dollars in assistance, sell them tens of billions of dollars’ worth of U.S. gear, it makes sense that we would be over there training and working.”
The US has been salami-slicing the one China policy, with an active campaign to undermine the credibility of UN resolution 2758, for instance. In early 2025 the State Department removed from its website a confirmation that the US does not support Taiwanese independence (February 2025), amidst moves by some Republicans in Congress (March 2025) to legislate the replacement of references to Chinese-Taipei with Taiwan.
The One China policy may exist in name, but has been in practical terms shredded by the Americans. Put plainly the U.S. is actively undermining another country’s territorial sovereignty, breaching its own agreements and commitments, and is actively stoking regional instability. It is a rogue across numerous transnational bodies, and has many decades of form in these actions.
Add to the malevolent role of the U.S. in Asian instability the recent suggestions of NATO expansion to Asia, articulated by French President Macron, and it is increasingly clear that the transatlantic powers are intent on pursuing another episode of militarised colonial aggression. A division of labour is being contrived with the Europeans stepping up to fill the void left by the Americans in western Eurasia as the U.S. sets its sights on China. Russia can be kept occupied by the Europeans for all Washington cares.
The lesson of Ukraine is that the U.S. and the collective west have no capacity to take on board the security interests of others. They turn a blind eye to protests from others about security concerns insisting that they aren’t threats and are motivated by peaceful motives. The debacle in Ukraine shows how shallow this is, and no one should fall for the ruse.
A Diplomatic Demarche
Against this backdrop, China has every reason to raise its level of concern and opposition to American interference in Taiwan, and to do so with confidence not just procedural necessity.
It could pursue this through two coincident actions, triggered by either a delivery of arms to Taipei or further reports of U.S. troops active on the island. First, it lodges a serious demarche with the U.S. via conventional diplomatic channels insisting the U.S. categorically commit to the One China policy and desist from supplying armaments and military assistance to the administration headquartered in Taipei. The U.S. will doubtless dismiss this Just as it had done to Russian protests at NATO’s expansion over the past two decades. Second, and at the same time, notice is given for a special session of the UN Security Council to address exactly the same issues.
At the UNSC, the Russians and Chinese vote in favour of a resolution to this effect. The UK and France may simply abstain, knowing that the U.S. will exercise its power of veto in any case. Why, in that case, would China bother with this course of action at all?
By going to the UNSC, the aim is to seize the narrative. By lodging an emergency motion at the UN Security Council, seeking the passage of a resolution prohibiting the sale and transfer of military arms, advisors and logistical support to the Taiwan authorities, Beijing is able to prosecute a number of tactical and strategic objectives. Firstly, it would frame China as the responsible power. The resolution is presented as a conflict-prevention measure, aimed at de-escalating tensions and blocking arms races. Beijing positions itself as acting within the spirit of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of any state. Such a move would also possibly serve to divide the West and isolate the U.S. Some U.S. allies - especially in the Global South and within ASEAN - may be reluctant to be seen opposing a resolution that seeks peace and restraint. Whether it does or doesn’t isn’t that important, but is a nice diplomatic ‘cherry on the cake’. The vote forces each UNSC member (and other UN member states watching closely) to declare a position on the arms-to-Taiwan question.
Even if vetoed, the resolution raises the diplomatic and reputational cost for countries continuing to send arms to Taipei. It can shape a global perception of the U.S. and its allies as perpetuating instability and being the source of crisis. Lastly, it would reinforce the civil war framing. By framing the Taiwan situation as an internal affair, China can argue that foreign arms shipments violate non-intervention norms and threaten peace.
A Ring of Defence
As the U.S. vetoes the UNSC resolution it is clear that it intends to continue acting as a rogue and regional agent provocateur. Its actions clearly undermine China’s national sovereignty and regional security. In the name of protecting its own territories, and ensuring regional stability, the PLAN and PLANAF establish a ring of defence around Taiwan, putting in place a no fly zone and a naval interdiction zone. It accomplishes this within 6-12 hours, a capability already demonstrated over the past 2 years. This will be accompanied by cyber & electronic warfare operations so that Taiwan’s command infrastructure is disrupted so as to paralyse response capability without direct kinetic engagement. The message to Taipei is clear: Beijing frames the action as a response to provocations. Taipei is offered the “opportunity” to negotiate a new modus vivendi with the mainland to resolve the unresolved civil war impasse.
In doing so, China is acting in defence of its own territorial integrity. After all, Taiwan is recognised by 190+ countries as being an inalienable part of China. Intervention by third parties in such a circumstance requires the (formal) abandonment of a one China policy. After all, China - or more precisely, the People’s Republic of China - is moving decisively to protect and defend the One China position from threats.
Taiwan is legally Chinese territory under international consensus, including de jure recognition by the United States under the One China Policy. Unless that policy is revoked, which would be a political rupture of enormous magnitude, any Chinese military action can be presented as ‘an internal matter of restoring sovereign authority over separatist elements.’ The U.S. would thus be seen not as a defender of democracy, but as interfering in a domestic civil conflict, and violating its own diplomatic commitments made in 1972 (Shanghai Communiqué), 1979 (normalisation) and 1982 (August 17 Communiqué). Of course, this will be a question of ‘interpretation’ and acceptance, but aside from the usual clutch of American allies, who else would buy the American positioning?
Will the U.S. abandon its admittedly wafer thin commitment to the One China policy, and respond aggressively? If it did so, it would affirm China’s assessment that the U.S. is acting to undermine national sovereignty. It would also confirm the American position to the Global South whose support is an important part of the overall diplomatic (and economic) arrangement.
If China moves decisively without Taipei declaring independence and without U.S. recognition of Taiwanese sovereignty (see next section), then the US confronts a triple bind. First, intervention would entail a declaration of war with a nuclear power with ambiguous legal and moral foundations, at best. Second, non-intervention would result in the collapse of American credibility in Asia. This is most feared by U.S. strategic planners and allies who’ve banked on the Americans being there forever. Lastly, the U.S. could recognise Taiwan as an independent state, trash the One China Policy, which would trigger automatic war with China.
Will the U.S. risk Washington DC, New York and Los Angeles? In this scenario, China does not need to fire a shot in anger to begin shifting reality on the ground. By reframing any military move as internal policing of separatist threats, it leverages international legal norms, and U.S. policy contradictions, to neutralise Washington's options. Washington’s long-held ‘strategic ambiguity’ only held when the balance of power was patently asymmetric in its favour. That’s simply no longer the case, which renders this ‘ambiguity’ increasingly meaningless.
The fact is, this is 2025 not 1962 or 1996. In 1996, the U.S. could send carriers through the Taiwan Strait with impunity. Today, PLA Rocket Force and coastal missile batteries can sink those carriers before they get close. And Washington knows it. So do Tokyo and Seoul. So when a Chinese defence cordon is established around the island, the U.S. is confronted with the possibility that any response is an act of aggression against Chinese territory, and any recognition of Taipei as a sovereign actor is a declaration of war.
Taipei’s Day of Reckoning
With the island secured against external threats, what does Taipei do? Taipei isn’t unified in any case. There’s as much likelihood of the military turning on any separatist administration (assuming one controlled the executive), and instigating martial law (again), which would then lead to a rapid negotiation for a peace settlement with the mainland. I speak of a realistic possibility that sidesteps the Hollywood scenario of heroic resistance and instead moves through a sequence of internal collapse, political fragmentation and elite recalibration.
Let’s be clear on the conditions of this scenario - and it is just a scenario, not an advocacy position or prediction. First, as noted, the PLA secures the maritime and air perimeter without firing a shot. Washington declines to escalate beyond diplomatic and economic protest. Taipei is left isolated, economically strangled, politically destabilised. For now, there is no formal declaration of independence by the Taiwanese executive; under the prevailing ROC Constitution this isn’t possible in any case. Assuming a pro-independence administration is still in office, the legitimacy and unity of the government in Taipei begin to fracture.
So, how does this unfold? Firstly, as the effects of the cordon materialise, business elites on the Island (particularly in finance and manufacturing) demand de-escalation to preserve trade, property and offshore assets. Political divisions undoubtedly harden, between pro-status quo moderates, pro-independence hardliners and realists pushing for reconciliation. The Military command splits as the prospect of being dragged into a doomed separatist last stand triggers internal reassessment. The military will be the decisive actor as events unfold. Taiwan’s military has long been status quo-oriented, not revanchist or radical. In the face of economic collapse, diplomatic isolation and no path to victory, a faction within the military may suspend civilian government, declare emergency law, and seek an interim ‘peace arrangement’ with Beijing. Precedent exists: martial law was imposed in Taiwan before (1949–1987). It is not unthinkable in a national emergency.
Taipei won’t respond militarily to the PLAN and PLANAF perimeter. Any attempt to break the blockade by Taiwan’s forces would immediately justify kinetic PLA responses, and undermine Taipei’s own claim to legitimacy and prudence. Taipei’s military knows this and won’t commit suicide. Taiwan is cut off. The economy risks being ground to a halt as supplies of energy and other necessities dwindle. The political crisis on the island spirals.
In this scenario, within 72–96 hours of the protective cordon being put into place global markets panic and Taipei's executive fractures. Either the civilian leadership folds or the military declares martial law and sues for terms.
No war. No shots fired. Just isolation, paralysis and regime collapse.
Then, a ‘One Country, Two Systems’ formula, tailored for Taiwan, could be offered, which includes provision for internal autonomy, the preservation of property rights and legal systems, limited to no PLA presence beyond agreed zones, and the gradual harmonisation of external affairs and defence. These talks won’t be easy, but it is conceivable in these conditions to proceed post haste and deliver an agreed pathway to the resolution of the civil war and the realisation of political unification without war.
There will be no formal invasion. This is inconceivable for American military planners, but that’s precisely the point. There is no need for the PRC to pursue the kind of actions that Americans would typically resort to in the pursuit of the end goal. Rather, we see a managed political transition, leveraging the PLA’s strategic containment, U.S. paralysis, Taiwan’s internal fragmentation and China’s ability to offer carrots alongside sticks. This is the quiet endgame, not a dramatic showdown, but a return to martial law, followed by political reintegration, driven not by ideology but by raw survival instincts. Taiwanese society is not united behind independence; polls consistently show large numbers favouring ambiguity and status quo. Taiwan’s business elite is heavily embedded in China-linked trade and investment.
The PLA doesn’t need to destroy Taiwan; it just needs to establish a cordon to prevent external forces from further destabilising national sovereignty … and wait. The U.S. is unlikely to intervene militarily.
Why will the U.S. be neutered in its responses? There are a variety of reasons, which I will discuss below.
As the encirclement happens for real, ambassadors in Beijing from Seoul, Pyongyang, Tokyo, Manila and all ASEAN capitals will be briefed. Moscow will have been briefed. Regional dynamics will have been unleashed that lay the groundwork for the reshaping of the regional security order. I will come back to this later, but before we do that, we need to place the Taiwan question without the broader regional and strategic ambit.
Changing Regional Contours
American Hesitancy & Preference for Risk Transfer
Faced with the triple dilemma noted earlier, is the U.S. likely to declare war on China? Unlikely as a first move, despite intensive domestic pressure to do so. Its first move will more likely be to press Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Australia to take action. It is hard to see any of these four nations buying into the conflict without guarantees of an American backstop. Yet, will the U.S. offer this backstop in ways that are credible for third parties to put themselves into harm's way? The lesson of Ukraine isn’t the one drawn by French President Emmanuel Macron recently at the Shangri-La Security Summit - namely that Taiwan could become the next Ukraine whose sovereignty is impinged (a de jure impossibility); the lesson is that the U.S. will encourage patsies and groom proxies to fight its wars. Who wants to be the next Ukraine, dragged down the Asian Primrose Path to do America’s bidding?
The U.S. is engaged in acts that can be better described as coercive hedging rather than any meaningful moves towards real defence. The U.S. isn’t preparing to defend Taiwan in a meaningful or sustainable way. It is preparing Taiwan to inflict damage (like Ukraine) as a deterrent by punishment, not deterrence by denial. This echoes Cold War strategies of arming proxies to bleed adversaries, but it assumes China will play along. This approach from the U.S. is premised on strategic incoherence. It at best accepts that a stalemate is the ‘best’ outcome but refuses to make concessions or initiate diplomatic normalisation. This reflects a strategy adrift. "Strategic ambiguity" today equals "strategic paralysis"; paralysing allies more than adversaries.
The U.S. is in the business of risk transfer. It is offloading both military and political risk onto Taipei, Tokyo, Seoul and Canberra. Taiwan’s militarisation is not a sign of impending victory, but a signal that Washington knows it won’t fight the war itself. Coupled with strategic drift, there is no end-game in sight. Put plainly, there is no plausible "victory" scenario. Retaking the mainland is fantasy. Preventing reunification indefinitely is unsustainable. There is no political strategy to match the military build-up.
The U.S. is preparing Taiwan for symbolic sacrifice. Just as Ukraine has been encouraged to resist without any NATO backstop, Taiwan is being armed not to survive, but to become the next tripwire, a pawn in a broader narrative of democracy vs. autocracy or Trump’s return to great power politics. This is performative deterrence, not existential defence. Only ideologues and fools will fall for this. Thus, while commentators like The Guardian’s Simon Tisdall argue that Trump’s own cowardice lays the groundwork for war, I tend to think it’s the opposite. Declaring war on a nuclear peer isn’t cowardice in any case, regardless of what Koolaid Tisdall has been imbibing of late - it’s self preservation at work in the most sensible of ways.
There may well be a Nobel Peace Prize in this for the present occupant of the White House, after all!
The Myth of Deterrence via Cost Imposition
Pete Hegseth and others in the U.S. defence apparatuses speak of deterrence in terms of a ‘cost imposition’. This is a strategic fallacy built on a flawed premise. The premise goes something like this; If Taiwan is armed enough - with missiles, drones and assorted asymmetric warfare capabilities - it will become too costly for China to act.
This logic relies on two deeply problematic assumptions. First, it assumes that China’s calculus is economic or tactical. Second, and most significantly, it assumes that the U.S. or Taiwan can set the terms of deterrence. Beijing’s decision frame isn’t reducible to economic calculus. It is a question of national rejuvenation; it is existential and grounded ultimately in a sense of national identity. The Taiwan question is not a transactional issue. It is bound to historical continuity and national rejuvenation. No cost imposed by Taiwan or the U.S. - short of full-scale nuclear retaliation - will outweigh Beijing's imperative to resolve the status of Taiwan. In this light, deterrence by threat of punishment is meaningless.
This is buttressed by material realities. PLA troop, air, and naval superiority in the Taiwan Strait is unassailable. U.S. logistics chains are vulnerable; China fights on its doorstep. No combination of mobile missile systems, asymmetric doctrines, or “porcupine” strategies can overcome the basic math: China has more, and it’s right there. On top of that, the combat effectiveness of US-supplied systems is doubtful. Systems such as Patriot, NASAMS, and HIMARS are unproven in dense, multi-domain, saturation conflict environments and have already been found wanting in Ukraine. They require highly trained crews, logistics networks and command integration - all of which are hard to sustain on-island - particularly when it is encircled. This is why a defensive cordon is paramount. The forces on Taiwan lack strategic depth; if these systems are not decisive within hours, they are simply target practice. Unlike Ukraine, there are no land borders from which to re-arm Taiwan mid-conflict.
As for arguments about ‘international costs’, these are more than likely to be fictional. There will be no meaningful international sanctions regime against China. The Global South won’t participate. The EU is economically exposed and politically divided. ASEAN will avoid entanglement. India will hedge. African, Latin American and Middle Eastern states will stay neutral. Beijing has already de-risked this scenario through various initiatives. These include expanded BRICS trade, energy and commodity security via Russia, Central Asia and Iran, and more widely its dual-circulation economic strategy. Put plainly, there is no international economic wall waiting to be built against Beijing. The Trump tariffs dress rehearsal demonstrates this.
The DPRK Dimension
In any case, there are wider regional dynamics that will likely act as deterrence against any moves by third parties to encroach on Chinese domestic matters. The first of these is the DPRK–China Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty, signed in 1961 and still in force. This treaty explicitly obligates the DPRK to come to China’s aid if it is attacked. This oft-forgotten treaty reshapes the deterrence landscape in a Taiwan Strait or broader East Asian crisis, particularly if U.S., Japanese or Australian forces engage the PLA in open conflict.
The DPRK is the ‘trigger ally’. Any involvement by third parties in the Taiwan matter could open a second front. If Japan or the U.S., or any other nation for that matter, engages Chinese forces in or around Taiwan, the DPRK is legally bound to act. This means Seoul, Tokyo, and even U.S. forces in Guam and Okinawa, come into immediate targeting range. The DPRK doesn’t need to wait for direct provocation, it only needs to claim China is under external attack. South Korea knows that it would be devastated. Seoul lies within artillery and short-range missile range of DPRK. No missile defence system can guarantee protection from the scale of firepower the DPRK can unleash. Therefore, ROK’s margin of manoeuvre is virtually zero; it cannot be seen to support aggressive U.S. / Japanese action. As for Japan, it would face risks that it cannot absorb. Even a few DPRK missile strikes on Yokosuka or Tokyo would be catastrophic. The Japanese public is deeply risk-averse and political leadership knows that any trigger of DPRK response would destroy trust in governance.
In addition to the DPRK–China Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty, we have the Russia–DPRK Agreement. In 2024, the DPRK and Russia revived and expanded their Soviet-era security pact. This includes military cooperation, mutual defense consultations and technology sharing. While it stops short of NATO-style automatic intervention, it clearly signals strategic alignment, joint threat perception and a shared interest in defending against Western (U.S.-led) aggression. The implication is straightforward: any Western military action against the DPRK would likely provoke a coordinated or parallel response from Russia, particularly cyber, missile or intelligence support.
De facto and de jure, we have here what could be described as tripwire deterrence and the presence of indivisible security. This configuration radically shifts how aggression must be considered. Any attack on one triggers the others. The DPRK becomes, in effect, a tripwire ally, not because it is powerful, but because any strike on it risks escalation with China and Russia. It creates a de facto indivisible security zone across Northeast Asia extending to the Arctic frontier.
The strategic realities for the U.S. and its allies are that the Taiwan question cannot be considered outside of a wider regional context. The DPRK–China treaty creates extended deterrence for China, whether directly activated or not. This means a U.S.–China conflict risks being regionalised immediately, with three nuclear powers (PRC, DPRK, U.S.) and two major allied economies (Japan, ROK) caught in the crossfire. Throw in Russia and we have a 4-way nuclear capable stand-off.
Therefore, Taiwan is not an isolated scenario. Rather, it’s a potential regional war fuse. As such, any attack on PLA forces in the Taiwan Strait region risks automatic activation of DPRK as a second front. Any American or allied intervention would not only be legally ambiguous, but it is likely to be militarily catastrophic for Seoul and Tokyo, and politically indefensible to domestic populations.
Seoul and Tokyo understand this, even if Washington continues with its ambiguity. This drives backchannel exploration of new regional security architectures, where DPRK is seen as a rational strategic actor, not a rogue. Oh, how the worm turns! It opens a path for long-term détente, particularly if DPRK’s renunciation of reunification is leveraged as a stabilising commitment to the status quo, as I have flagged previously. And it forces recognition of indivisible security whereby no country in East Asia can ignore how deeply interwoven the defence commitments now are.
What about Australia?
Both Tokyo and Seoul are reconfiguring their regional postures. Japan is incrementally shifting toward autonomous strategic capabilities and has strong domestic debate on the scope of its involvement. I have discussed Japan’s ambitions and ongoing manoeuvring elsewhere. The ROK is wary of being dragged into a conflict that could trigger DPRK retaliation, especially given its proximity to Pyongyang and Seoul’s vulnerability.
Their reluctance, or hedging posture, puts Australia in the spotlight and possibly isolates it as the most ‘pliable’ military actor in the Anglosphere expected to respond under a U.S. ‘coalition of the willing.’ Australia’s strategic dilemma is that it will be trapped amidst U.S. retrenchment and regional realignment.
Australia’s alliance with the United States (anchored in the ANZUS Treaty) places it within the framework of U.S.-led Indo-Pacific security. However, geography puts Australia squarely within the Asian neighbourhood, economically and increasingly strategically tied to East and Southeast Asia. This creates an irreconcilable tension. On the one hand we have the fact that the U.S. expects compliance and alignment, especially in moments of military escalation. On the other hand, however, we have Australia’s direct interests - trade, energy flows and long term regional goodwill - that are deeply embedded in Asia’s stability, not its militarisation.
In the event of a PRC encirclement of Taiwan (especially under the pretext of a sovereignty defense operation), the U.S. is unlikely to directly engage unless Taipei declares formal independence or American troops come under direct threat. Instead, Washington is likely to pressure allies to take the front foot. For Australia, this is fraught. Canberra has no formal obligation to defend Taiwan. Yet, under AUKUS and Five Eyes, Australia is increasingly woven into American planning architectures (e.g., forward basing, logistics support and joint ISR activities). Supporting Taiwan militarily would violate Australia's One China policy, undermining its diplomatic standing in ASEAN and beyond.
If Australia steps into a Taiwan-related conflict, it risks becoming a proxy actor in a war it cannot shape or control. It would place itself at risk of economic retaliation - China remains Australia's largest trading partner - though it is unlikely this in and of itself will deter Australia if it felt compelled to inject itself militarily. Australia would make itself a legitimate military target. Australia also runs the risk of losing credibility among Southeast Asian nations, who see Australia increasingly aligned with extra-regional agendas, not as a constructive regional partner.
Conversely, stepping back would challenge assumptions in Washington about Australia’s reliability. In doing so it would create an opening for Australia to redefine its sovereignty and regional posture, particularly if Japan and Korea are also hedging. If nothing else, it would unleash a large-scale national debate in Australia that would place doubts in its allegiances dependencies fairly and squarely on the table. And so, like other regional actors, Australia must choose between strategic alignment with the U.S., and accepting a role in a Taiwan contingency, despite limited national interest and high risk or a strategic recalibration, or asserting an autonomous regional security role, contributing to stability, economic resilience and a multipolar regional order. No wonder Australia’s preference has long been the kick this can down the road.
A Taiwan Straits crisis would put Australia into the strategic firing line. It cannot afford to follow Washington blindly into conflicts that could engulf the region or be cajoled or forced by Washington to lead with its chin. As Japan and South Korea hedge and recalibrate, Canberra must reassess its risk exposure, alliance assumptions and the meaning of national interest in a rapidly shifting regional order.
Moment of Truth
As these events unfold against the backdrop of shifting regional contours, the conclusion is that American credibility will be dealt a severe blow. Taipei and Beijing proceed with the final resolution of the civil war as a domestic matter. Taiwan becomes a symbol not of freedom lost, but of realism reclaimed. Japan and ROK re-evaluate their entire posture, not to militarise, but to diversify diplomatic and economic security. ASEAN drifts further from Washington and towards a more active neutrality with China. Australia meanwhile prevaricates, holding out for a return of the security blanket of transatlantic allegiance.
And as all this unfolds, a space opens for a new regional framework, built around respect for security indivisibility, economic integration (ASEAN, Siberia and Arctic sea route), an acceptance of the DPRK’s new posture as a status quo, nuclear-armed deterrent state, rather than a revolutionary one whereby North Korea’s security is anchored in a trilateral deterrence triangle with China and Russia.
This means the logic of collective security must shift. From a strategic frame governed by ‘containment’, engagement and a new balance becomes imperative. Cold War binaries will be pressured to give way to multipolar risk management. And, from isolating Pyongyang the strategic imperative is to involve it in the regional security recalibration. Given the limitations of current deterrence strategies, and the risks they pose in terms of arms races, a reassessment of the strategic architecture in the Indo-Pacific is necessary.
Amidst the flux, Japan and ROK would sensibly initiate quiet strategic dialogues with the DPRK, China and Russia (possibly via Track II and informal channels) to explore economic cooperation along the Arctic-Siberia-Northeast Asia corridor and broader matters. Assurances will be exchanged. I discuss these dynamics elsewhere. In doing so, the discussion will in effect consider reframing national security from military alliance dependence to geoeconomic resilience. For ASEAN, they can continue supporting regional non-alignment diplomacy and opposition to hard bloc formations. ASEAN could very well be positioned as mediators in regional de-escalation frameworks. The spirit of Bandung can be mobilised.
A New Regional Architecture
And so we move from crisis to the need for regional actors to create a new regional security architecture. An Asia Security Summit will be necessary, embodying the political pivot to a new Eurasian order. The dualities of the Cold War era collapse, as the US-led ‘hubs and spokes’ system loses credibility. The DPRK is no longer treated as a rogue, but is recognised as a nuclear-backed security stakeholder. This is backed by the trilateral deterrence triangle of China-Russia-DPRK stitched together through binding and quasi-binding mutual defence understandings.
As Beijing imposes facts on the ground around Taiwan, it simultaneously frames the moment as an opportunity to transcend Cold War binaries, reject bloc-based militarisation and promote inclusive Eurasian security architecture. This takes the form of a proposed Asia Security Summit, building off the momentum of:
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO);
The Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA);
The China–Central Asia Summit; and
A reinvigorated Global Security Initiative (GSI).
Such a summit would present US alliances in Asia as outdated Cold War structures fostering conflict rather than stability. It would then aim to normalise Eurasian-led security, by proposing a Eurasia Security Club rooted in non-intervention, sovereignty and development. It could also see security guarantees or non-aggression frameworks for Japan, ROK and DPRK floated quietly, as a peace architecture for North East Asia. In this context, China would be positioned as a regional stabiliser and a global system shaper. Attendees would include all SCO members, all ASEAN members, ROK, Japan and DPRK.
Such a summit would aim to develop and agree on an indivisible security framework to replace the hostile bifurcation of the Cold War era, with zones of mutual non-aggression and economic cooperation. Northeast Asia (Korean Peninsula, Northeast China, Eastern Russia and the Japanese periphery) could become a deconfliction and co-development zone, with the development of energy and food resources in Siberia central to future stabilisation. The integration of SE Asia via BRICS-China-GCC summits and trade agreements like RCEP would anchor the south east node of Eurasia.
End Game
In the scenario painted, we have two inflection points that fundamentally reshape the configuration of Asian regional security. Firstly, we have the question of Taiwan and moves by China to address growing security risks occasioned by ongoing American military supplies to Taipei and American troops positioned within 10km of the Chinese mainland. Secondly, and not too far removed, is the question of the DPRK. The renunciation of reunification by the DPRK, combined with the trilateral reinforcement of its strategic status via China and Russia, presents a strategic opportunity. So far, no-one seems to have grasped the moment, perhaps hamstrung by the rigid mindsets associated with post-war alliances. In any case, a Taiwan security intervention on the part of Beijing could catalyse a series of events that - if managed effectively by the major players - could deliver not chaos but the chances of a new peace in Asia.
The era of rigid alliance blocs is ending. In its place, a multipolar architecture defined by mutual deterrence, overlapping economic interests and flexible regional diplomacy is emerging. This is a moment of opportunity, not to escalate, but to reimagine the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia as a stabilising bulwark for whole-of-Eurasian security with a peaceful resolution to the Chinese civil war, and a consolidation of the role of ASEAN as a critical link between North Asia and the Gulf States.
The scenarios described in this essay are but one set of possibilities. I have sought to neither advocate nor be predictive, but have done so with the aim of better understanding what is at stake and what is conceivable and possible. Even in some cases, probable.
If nothing else, this process has reaffirmed the possibility of hope without the necessity of optimism.