America’s Asia Primacy? Requiem and Regional Dangers
Weakness & Desperation make for a volatile combination
While the recent trilateral meeting involving the US, Japan and Philippine leaders was hailed by some observers as emblematic of America’s unwavering commitment to its interests in Asia, it paradoxically evinced a sense of there being funeral rites in progress. Just as Japan’s Prime Minister Kishida, in his speech to the American Congress, lauded America’s role as a global peace anchor since eviscerating two Japanese cities in 1945, injecting a sense of boosterism in the face of American “self-doubt”, he was also singing a hymn to the end of America’s Unipolarity in Asia. He damned American incapacity with faint praise just as he readied to debut Japan as a fully fledged exporter of next-generation fighter aircraft to be developed jointly with the United Kingdom and Italy. Kishida is committed to an American presence in Asia, without a doubt, but Japan’s re-energised military posture speaks to a strategic reckoning that the U.S. is no longer capable of being the unilateral hegemon of Asia. When Kishida said “the U.S. should not be expected to do it all, unaided and on your own,'' the message wasn’t so subtle: the US can no longer do it on its own.
Kishida’s speech to the American Congress comes at a time when the United States has intensified its efforts to assert or reclaim American Primacy in Asia. Assert if one holds the view that it still holds military preponderance; reclaim if one believes that it doesn’t. Kishida is in the latter camp, for what that’s worth. Through a series of so-called mini-lateral arrangements, the US has in recent years sought to enlist its Asia Pacific client states, former colonies and subimperial allies to anchor a 21st Century bulwark on the western edge of America’s Lake. The Quad, AUKUS and now the trilateral involving Japan and the Philippines form part of a lattice-like network, in all practical intents and purposes, aimed squarely at the containment of China. The rationalisation is the preservation of regional stability and a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ and the deterrence of Chinese aggression in the South China Sea and across the Taiwan Straits are the two immediate focal points. While the latest trilateral is all about China, Japan is exploiting the contemporary circumstances to abandon its pacifist posture, and reassert itself as a military force that can one day step out of America’s shadow.
The rhetoric of deterrence is one thing, but the practical implications are another. Contrary to the claims, I suggest that the pursuit of American Primacy in the name of deterrence doctrine is actually aggravating regional insecurities and increasing risks of conflict. Put plainly, the pursuit of US Primacy in Asia is anathema to stability and peace in the region. If the US and its assorted regional allies are seriously interested in regional stability and peace, a strategic policy framed by deterrence doctrine would be abandoned and a greater commitment to engaging in regional multilateralism would be made. But regional multilateralism, anchored by ASEAN Centrality, would be anathema to American Primacy.
American Primacy in Global Context
The dynamics in Asia aren’t detached from the broader issues confronting American hegemony globally. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the US has occupied an unchallenged position as Global Hegemon. In the period since, the US embarked on more military interventions on average per year than it had in the period between the end of WW2 and 1991. As Duffy Toft and Kushi have documented, between 1946-91, the US initiated on average 2.4 military interventions per year. This increased to 3.7 per year between 1991-2019. Duffy Toft and Kushi describe the US as a country “addicted to military intervention”. The Costs of War Project at Brown University estimates that over 4.6 million lives have been lost and 38 million people displaced in five American wars since 2001. The contrast with Kishida’s portrayal of America’s historic role couldn’t be more stark. Kishida was clearly playing to an audience.
The unipolar moment was not, however, to last forever. History barely rested, let alone end. By the late 2010s, American primacy was over. Some form of Multipolarity had emerged. In the European context, this manifested as the reemergence of Russia as a great power, and in Asia the consolidation of China’s rise. American scholar John Mearsheimer argues that a tripolar world emerged around 2018. Others suggest alternative timings and configurations but whatever the precise date or the precise characterisation of these powers, the point is this: uncontested American unilateral military preponderance had come to an end. This is, doubtless, a bitter pill to swallow for some and a cause of alarm for others. Kishida, incidentally, sees it as a window of opportunity to be deftly exploited.
The unfolding defeat of US proxy Ukraine at the hands of Russia, despite years of NATO support and training, has exposed the collective west’s systemic fragilities. The pursuit of NATO expansion into Ukraine not only provoked Russia’s ultimate response, but also served to drive Russia and China closer. For Mearsheimer this epitomised the folly of provoking Russia. As for frailties, the war in Ukraine has been a “system on system” contest: doctrine, equipment, personnel and critically the capacity of industrial supply chains. Having lulled itself into a false sense of confidence, the collective west’s system has been exposed. Russia was more than a “gas station masquerading as a country”. Russia’s army was not run by drunks, and it certainly was not running out of capacity. Full scale economic sanctions, aimed at bringing Russia’s economy to its knees and instigating regime change in the Kremlin, have backfired. Von der Leyen claimed Russia’s economy was “in tatters” and that it was raiding washing machines for chips. Neither were true.
Conversely, the collective west’s field doctrine has been found wanting, as explained by former NATO officer Jacques Baud; but perhaps more poignant is the fact that its much-vaunted leadership in weaponry has been exposed. Its productive capacity is no match for the Russian’s industrial machine. The US army is running out of weapons, reports Jack Detsch in Foreign Policy. Its Wunderwaffe, one after another, have been destroyed in the theatre of battle.
Asian Primacy?
In Asia, for over 70 years the US has embarked on an ongoing military build-up and permanent troop presence. It has over 80,000 permanent military personnel stationed on over 240 military bases across North East Asia and the Pacific. The American blue water navy is supposedly the most feared array of capability ever amassed. Since 2000, the US’ overall defence budget has been an accumulated $16.05T. This is not trivial, even if there concerns that it has not been well managed or spent, with the Pentagon failing its sixth consecutive audit this past year.
Yet, despite decades of head start and insuperable defence spending leadership, the US has reached a point where many now doubt its primacy in Asia. James Holmes in a recent lecture at the U.S. Naval War College cautioned against the presupposition of U.S. preponderance on the basis of budget alone. Indeed, he made a good argument for why Purchasing Power Parity is a more meaningful way of comparing countries, arguing that either China or Russia got more for a dollar invested than did the Americans. He takes aim at various “zombie” arguments about American naval prowess and maritime strategy (budget, tonnage, number of hulls or airframes) before turning to the map of the Pacific to show why it is so hard for the U.S. navy to overpower a rival great power in its own backyard. That’s the tyranny of distance effect.
Analysts such as Elbridge Colby sound the alarm that the US is no longer able to pursue detente from a “position of strength”. For Colby, and many others amongst Washington’s policy elite, the U.S.’ immediate challenge is to regain some semblance of “balance in its favour”. That “balance in our favour” is oxymoronic, seems to have eluded Colby.
Budgetary constraints have been exposed as a critical limitation to these ambitions. Industrial capacity is another. The U.S. has had no choice but to dragoon its Asian client states, former colonies and subimperial allies into a new mission of primacy reclamation. Colby has argued that the U.S. cannot sustain a two-war strategy and it must reduce its commitments in Europe and the Middle East, otherwise it will not be able to deal with the issues in Asia. The various mini-laterals pulled together over the past few years is as much a reflection of vestigial leverage and loyalties as it is a symptom of American limitations. The aim, however, will be to subsume partner forces under American military command should the need arise. Interoperability is a key design imperative, so as to meet expectations that allied forces will accede to US dictated priorities.
The unfolding AUKUS nuclear submarines debacle exemplifies all the limitations - financially and industrially. The financing of the nuclear submarines - the signature feature of the AUKUS arrangement - is something left for the Australians. Congress itself remains deeply concerned about American production capacity to meet its own requirements let alone supply submarines that would be lost to American control. Each year, the US is building, on average, 1.2 to 1.3 submarines. To meet its own targets, it needs to increase output to an average of two Virginia class submarines per year. If it’s to deliver 3 submarines to Australia in the 2030s, output would need to rise to 2.33 per year. This is unlikely. Unsurprisingly, expectations that the submarines will ultimately not be lost to American command were made clear recently by Kurt Campbell, affirming long-held concerns that the AUKUS deal would subordinate Australian sovereignty when it most counted - in a conflict over Taiwan.
The American blue water navy is powerful, no doubt. But it is not omnipotent. The tyranny of distance is a primary threat to US military success in the western Pacific, together with the tyranny of water, time and scale. Many of America’s naval vessels are in dry dock. Nearly 40% of US attack submarines are out of commission at any one time. Repairs are delayed due to worker shortages and supply chain issues. Maintenance programs are running months behind schedule with massive backlogs impacting deployment availability. Maintenance program delays compound serious doubts about the durability of much of the hardware. The USS Boxer has, for example, had to return for further maintenance just ten days into a Pacific deployment.
Air dominance is another dimension of US military power in the Pacific that is now in serious doubt. Distance from supply lines weakens the capacity of force projection (as has been demonstrated in the supply chain failures in Ukraine), which undermines US airpower deterrence. For some analysts, China’s air force could “achieve air denial, and possibly even air superiority, without ever defeating US air superiority fighters in combat”. As to whether the US air force is combat ready at all, it’s another question that casts a pall of doubt over American capability. The American F-16 has experienced a number of in-flight emergencies of late, and there are doubts as to the US military’s ability to keep the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter in the air, with spare parts shortages hampered by poor training of maintenance crew. There too are doubts as to the suitability of America’s ageing amphibious vehicles.
More recently, the failure to bring the Houthis to heel in the Red Sea exemplifies the navy’s combat limitations. The braggadocio isn’t matched by performance. None of this is to suggest that the US does not boast a highly destructive capability, but there are sufficient grounds - even on publicly available evidence - to conclude that unilateral preponderance is not a reality today. This conclusion may not be to the liking of ‘primacists’ in Washington and the wider network of American allies globally and in Asia, but is a present-day reality.
Deterrence Doctrine & its Dangers
Much of the talk of the need to build up America’s position in Asia hinges on the doctrine of deterrence. The stated object is to ‘deter’ China from aggression in the South China Sea and / or the Taiwan Straits.
China has a greater interest in ensuring the South China Sea remains safe for commercial traffic. That the U.S. has for years studied possible ways of blocking passageway through the Straits of Malacca has, undoubtedly, shaped China’s appraisal of risks to freedom of commercial navigation. Back in 2003, then Chinese President Hu Jintao spoke specifically of the “Malacca Dilemma” referring to the lack of alternatives and vulnerability to a naval blockade. In a clear reference to the U.S., he further suggested that “certain powers have all along encroached on and tried to control navigation through the [Malacca] Strait.” In the past 20 years, the balance of power in the South China Sea has clearly shifted. The U.S. navy no longer has carte blanche control over this body of ocean.
Territorial disputes remain points of contention. The tensions over the Second Thomas Shoal (Ren’ai Jiao) are the most visible manifestation of this. Despite Joe Biden’s recent declaration of “ironclad” support for the Philippines, it’s doubtful that the U.S. will be drawn in to direct naval engagement with China over the dispute. China will continue to forcefully assert and defend its position, just as the Philippines theirs.
In relation to the Taiwan question, the emerging conventional western trope revolves around a balancing dilemma. This has been recently described by Australia’s ambassador to Washington Kevin Rudd, as to how to deter an invasion of Taiwan without provoking unilateral action from China.
The doctrinal and practical dilemmas are laid bare in the lacuna of Rudd’s pithy formulation. First, there can be no invasion of one’s own country. This is an unfinished civil war. Second, unilateral People’s Republic of China action only comes with de facto or de jure moves towards Taiwanese independence. Support neither, and there’s next to no risk of unilateral mainland Chinese action. So, where do different mini-lateral participants stand on these pivotal issues? Where, for instance, does Australia stand on the question of Taiwanese independence? If it doesn’t support independence there is no basis for contemplating deterrence as a meaningful question, unless it wants to involve itself in a civil war. Third, if there’s any real concern about cross straits violence, then what are third parties doing to promote peace? And with that, enhance the prospects that the unfinished civil war will end without further bloodshed?
Deterrence doctrine is too limited to assist in creating meaningful peace. Rather, it risks catalysing escalation and further destabilisation. The failure of deterrence to work in Gaza is a recent example of the doctrine’s practical limitations. Hamas weren’t deterred despite the overwhelming asymmetry of forces vis-a-vis Israel. At best, building up arms in the name of deterrence may buy some time, but out-escalating an adversary is risky business particularly when one’s own situation is riddled with limitations as discussed earlier. In any case, the pursuit of arms build-up in the name of deterrence runs the distinct probability of intensifying a regional and possibly a global arms race. That’s not in the interests of stability, let alone peace.
Consequences of Asymmetry
The US either has lost primacy or the balance is no longer sufficiently in its favour to confidently claim primacy in Asia or, indeed, globally. The US has no way of achieving escalation dominance in either Europe or Asia. This reality hasn’t stopped chest-thumping or ambitions to regain the mantle of the global apex. But these ambitions are not conducive to peace.
Mearsheimer has long argued that provoking Russia into a conflict in Ukraine was foolhardy. Russia was for him a declining power, and China was and remains the real adversary. Pushing Russia and China closer together would be strategically counterproductive. A war in Ukraine would see Ukraine destroyed. That’s precisely what’s happening and the collective west is slowly coming to terms with impending defeat.
If taking on a declining power is foolhardy, why would provoking a rising peer power be any less foolhardy? Much less a situation in which Russia and China are now in de facto alliance? In Mearsheimer’s own terms, the collective west could not and will not beat Russia, and he sees China as a superior adversary than the Russians. Whatever the relativities between Russian and Chinese capabilities, there’s little doubt that neither are walk-overs. In all likelihood, despite the American’s obsessions with trying to hold the so-called first island chain, Chinese hypersonic missiles can already reach well beyond. And Russia’s blue water navy, including its own fleet of nuclear submarines, is already an active presence in the Pacific, and has participated in joint patrols with China’s navy.
In Europe, the U.S. and the collective west have led Ukraine up the Primrose Path. Who in Asia will fulfil the role of patsy? Japan’s Prime Minister Kishida, perhaps, inadvertently belled the cat when he said to the American Congress: “We are on deck, we are on task. And we are ready to do what is necessary.” If the experience of Ukraine is any guide, it’s unlikely to be the Americans leading the charge. Japan, the Republic of China forces on Taiwan or the Philippines; take your pick. Perhaps Australia too, if Kurt Campbell’s claims are to be taken seriously.
Concluding Remarks
Those that aren’t interested in detente will undoubtedly continue to pursue a manichean zero-sum objective, bolstered by a zealotry that comes from the millenarianism of American Exceptionalism. Deterrence doctrine is part of the problem, not part of the answer.
I write this not with an expectation let alone an aim of persuading the warmongers in the “greater blob” to desist. They won’t. The point is to alert those in the region, who prefer efforts aimed at crafting and sustaining institutions of stability that buttress economic development and create the conditions for sustained regional peace, to the dangers of American-led adventures. These adventures undermine Asian multipolar institutions, as a stepping stone to efforts aimed at reclaiming U.S. primacy. These efforts are incompatible with ASEAN Centrality, and anathema to peace in Asia.