A transatlantic fag-end or a western bulwark of Eurasia?
Challenges for European nations in a multipolar world
This is an English version of an essay originally published in Chinese in Guancha.cn, and expands on themes explored in a shorter essay published by China US Focus. Sleepwalking down the Primrose Path isn’t inevitable.
Europe as a geopolitical construct is now coming to, if not an end then certainly, a fork in the road. Having thrown its lot with the United States, the political economy and security architecture of the European Union (EU) project are now under strain as the reach of American hegemony wilts. The recent state visit by China President Xi Jinping to France, Serbia and Hungary has brought many of these strains into sharp relief.
The EU in Context
To understand the nature of the challenges, it’s important to have a grasp of the EU in historic terms. The world in which the EU was conceptualised and formed was one dominated by the Cold War stand-off between the US (the ‘west’ broadly conceived) and the Soviet Union or USSR. The EU was an intervention into this landscape, aimed at securing a discrete position within the geopolitical order that would amplify the perspectives and interests of European countries. The EU - as a post world war 2 initiative - was a colonial project from its inception. Its racialised raison d’être framed the construct in terms of a European whiteness extending its reach to the various European colonies of Africa and beyond. In a largely bipolar world, this geographic political economy was a necessary ballast if the EU was to have any influence at all. The EU was, thus, a geopolitical project from day one, with strong racialised overtones, seeking to secure a position for Europe’s colonial powers in the unfolding post-war world.
Meanwhile, the security architecture of Europe was secured by way of an awkward detente between the US-anchored NATO on the one hand, and the USSR on the other. Then, in the years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the EU was in effect enlisted into the broader American hegemony, particularly as NATO pushed eastwards. What was something of a European “strategic autonomy” in the post-war years progressively gave way to a dependent position within a broader collective western frame revolving around the U.S.
European challenges in the face of multipolarity
The postcolonial geopolitical pretences of the EU are now confronting the realities of a restructuring world. The apparent security and stability of the so-called Unipolar Moment, dominated by an ascendent America, has given way to the fluidity necessitated by an emerging multipolarity.
American unipolarity is now a memory. In broad terms, this evolution became evident during the mid 2010s as the economic global centre of gravity continued to shift towards Asia, and China more particularly. The shifting patterns of trade has over the past decade and a half seen the continued growth in interconnectivity between China and an expanding number of trading partners. China today is the largest trading partner of over 140 nations. For a long time, the EU was China’s largest trading partner but this position has recently been superseded by the ASEAN countries. As China’s economy grew to become the world’s largest in Purchasing Power Parity terms, or second largest in nominal USD terms, the overall significance of the Eurozone economy to the global economy experienced relative decline. Together with this decline also saw a diminution of its influence and credibility.
The reemergence of Russia as a great state has consolidated the trend of multipolarity. After decades of relative decay, the Russian economy progressively developed beyond a narrow base of hydrocarbons. It was more than a ‘gas station masquerading as a country’, as the late US Senator John McCain uncharitably described Russia in 2015.
In raw geopolitical terms, the French and U.S. are being pushed out of Africa. For an EU in which the idea of Eurafrica was part of its founding DNA, the loss of this footprint is a bitter blow. The French have been evicted from the Sahel in West Africa. The French military was pushed out of Niger at the end of 2023, on the back of its military operations in neighbouring Burkina Faso ending early 2023. The French daily, le Monde, observed that a failure to support economic development in the Sahel, led ultimately to the failure of decades of military presence. In April 2024 diplomatic relations further soured with French diplomats being asked to leave Niger, having been accused of subversive activities. The American military presence in Niger has been forced out too, as the new Niger regime strengthens its security cooperation with Russia. The ECOWAS sanctions against Niger, imposed in late 2023, were lifted in February 2024 in any sign of diminished western authority in that part of Africa.
Closer to home, the debacle in Ukraine has exposed the collective west in ways that were unimagined by a western elite still dining out on the ‘end of history’ hubris. This is as much a European problem as it is a broader transatlantic problem. The situation in Palestine is another case of exposed western delusions. Moves by the US and a handful of European allies to intervene and protect shipment through the Red Sea, in the face of attacks from the Yemeni Houthis, have not lived up to their promise. The west’s so-called Prosperity Guardian naval intervention failed to halt the attacks, as shipping continued to be diverted via the Cape of Good Hope.
The emerging multipolar landscape has economic and security features. These are interlocked. A Eurozone economy that experiences relative decline vis-a-vis the global economy as a whole is amplified by a military complex that is failing where it matters most: on the battlefield. Yet, against this landscape, the EU elite are presently doubling down on a narrative and strategy that aims to restore past conditions. On the steppes of Ukraine, coupled with 11 rounds of economic sanctions, the aim of the transatlantic allies was to weaken Russia to the point of causing economic catastrophe and regime change. This grand ambition has come to nought. Russia’s economy is stronger today than it was prior to the sanctions. Meanwhile, the Eurozone has been further weakened. As its economy weakened in the face of energy shocks and deindustrialisation, the EU’s diplomatic capital was also fading away.
Alternative possibilities
President Xi’s visit exposed the vacuity of Josep Borrell’s call, in October 2023, for the EU to be treated as a geopolitical power in its own right. In Paris, a few days ago, Ursula von der Leyen sang from Washington’s hymn sheet about China’s so-called ‘over capacity’. She spoke of waves of Chinese-made vehicles flooding the markets of Europe. All the while, the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA) provided data that showed Chinese EV brands claiming a market share of 6.4% in 2023. The ACEA report also showed that European carmakers experienced a trade surplus of €90 billion in 2023, relatively consistent with the previous year, on the back of rising production. Little wonder that Olive Zipse, Chairman of BMW Group, has warned that fears of competition from Chinese EV makers are overblown. In fact, he went so far as to say that, “[i]t is certainly not true that Europe’s currently being swamped with Chinese products.”
Macron demurred on the ‘over capacity’ claims as well, perhaps emblematic of a fracture in the attitudes of the French and the Germans towards competition. A couple of weeks earlier, German Chancellor Scholz visited China with corporate executives, pressing the case for market access for German automakers. Scholz’s efforts, echoing the messages from Washington, to pressure China in relation to its trade relations with Russia were politely dismissed. His wasn’t the only EU voice along these lines. China’s leadership dealt with them all consistently, dismissing them politely.
The EU’s lack of autonomy is most exemplified in the unfolding human tragedy and military debacle in Ukraine. That Ukraine was a security red line as far as the Russians were concerned goes back to the Munich Security conference of 2007. European leaders - indeed, the entire transatlantic political elite - cannot pretend they were not made aware of Russia’s concerns with NATO expansion and the extreme sensitivities in relation to expansion to Georgia and Ukraine. Yet, the Europeans went along with the American-inspired plan to extend NATO and destabilise Russia in the process. German Chancellor Merkel protested when in 2008 U.S. President George W. Bush made clear America’s position strongly supporting Georgia and Ukraine into NATO, but she was unable or unwilling to do more than that. Agreements reached at Minsk to stabilise the Ukraine situation were summarily ignored. The western European guarantors - France and Germany - had no intentions to enforce the terms as we have now all learned from admissions from then leaders Hollande and Merkel. Indeed, Merkel was clear: the Minsk agreements weren’t executed in good faith, but were merely charades aimed at buying time. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s army was being equipped and retrained in accordance with NATO standards, with considerable US assistance, in preparation for conflict.
An inability to come to a viable and stable detente with Russia could hardly be said to be in Europe’s long term interests. The principal EU powers gambled on a US-led plan to expand NATO. The gamble has not paid off. European security is worse today than it has been for decades. Its economic situation is parlous, as the energy shock occasioned by transatlantic sanctions against Russian oil and gas from mid-2022 onwards adversely impacted the competitiveness of European industry, even as European economies became more dependent on the US for energy than ever before. Deindustrialisation is a reality in core Eurozone economies today, and no doubt contributes to the sense of some Europeans who are uneasy in the face of growing Chinese imports.
Yet, while von der Leyen bloviated about ‘over capacity’, Europe’s alternative pathway became clearer as Xi Jinping landed in Serbia then Budapest.
In recent years, Hungary has sought to capitalise on the industrialisation potential of working with China’s EV leader, BYD. Not to be outdone, Barcelona’s old Nissan plant (shuttered in 2021) is being refurbished for EV production in a joint venture between Spanish firm EV Motors and China’s Chery. Turkiye is in advanced discussions with both Chery and BYD on establishing plants there. Even Italy’s government is reported to have reached out to BYD seeking their interest in setting up a factory. Serbia is also reaping the economic benefits of collaboration with China. Less than 200 km from the BYD factory in Szeged Hungary, we have the Linglong rubber tyre plant in Zrenjanin Serbia. An automotives cluster could be emerging, which straddles these two nations. Hungary is an EU member state; Serbia isn’t. This ‘in-out’ configuration offers potential advantages to investors seeking to optimise opportunity and manage risks.
Hungary and others are focused on re-industrialisation through partnerships with Chinese enterprises. Hungary was one of the first countries to commit to carbon neutrality by 2050. It plans to phase out coal fired power by 2030. The move to renewable energy is, for Hungary, not just an environmental commitment; it is also a strategic move aimed at driving down costs and increasing energy security and sovereignty. Chinese knowhow and manufacturing capacity is establishing a foothold in Hungary in solar power generation, electric vehicles and batteries by Nio and CATL amongst others. Green energy is seen as a key connecting point between China and central and eastern European countries.
Serbia too is working with Chinese enterprises to boost its renewable energy capabilities. It has recently secured a $2.18bn investment commitment from China to construct a 1.5GW wind farm, a 500 MW solar plant and a hydrogen production facility. The renewable energy projects are expected to come online by 2028. The Serbian government has also announced the execution of two agreements with Chinese firms to progress developments in the energy sector. One of these agreements is with Hunan Rich Photovoltaic Science and Technology to invest in renewable energy sources, envisaging investment in a 1 GW solar panel factory in the central city of Paracin and the construction of a solar photovoltaic (PV) power plant with a capacity of 200 MW.
A green energy transition is one best implemented with the least cost and at the greatest pace. In Europe, this can only be achieved through the importation of renewable energy technologies and hardware manufactured in China. Renewable energy also offers the potential to increase energy sovereignty while reducing energy costs.
Individual nations within the EU and on the EU’s periphery are finding that their interests and outlooks are increasingly out of step with those of the technocratic elite in Brussels.
The unfolding military debacle and human tragedy in Ukraine, and the associated energy crisis that Europe’s sanctions caused (not to mention the sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipeline), can be traced back to the disingenuous failure of the transatlantic elites to resolve a post Cold War security architecture that worked for all concerned - including Russia.
The economic turmoil facing European nations in the wake of energy shocks and the ongoing inability to resolve the Ukrainian crisis is spilling over into social disquiet and political agitation. Nationalist parties are riding a wave of public sentiment, with expectations that across the EU so called ‘far right’ parties are expected to make considerable gains in the upcoming EU election. Public opinion surveys suggest that far-right parties could finish first in nine EU states and second or third in another nine. The far right parties are generally speaking hostile to the continuation of the war in Ukraine, and seek a detente with Russia. The dynamics underpinning the growth of the new right in European politics is expected to reverberate in national elections across Europe itself.
As for attitudes towards China, a detailed survey of European attitudes conducted by Szazadveg Foundation in October 2023 finds that the majority of citizens do not favour the emerging ‘hard line’ from the Brussels-Washington axis but should seek peaceful economic cooperation.
Europe - an outpost of the American empire?
In the face of the sanctions war, Russia has consolidated its turn towards the East. This turn to the East emerged in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis of 2014, and the unfolding of that crisis has only accelerated the integration of Russia into the Eurasian economic body.
European nations now have clear, albeit challenging, decisions to make. The institutional gulf between the attitudes of citizens and the positions adopted by the EU elite in Brussels speaks to a fragile body politic in the midst of significant transition. Whether the EU project can endure the present economic and political crisis remains an open question. The unfolding western failure on the battlefields of Ukraine suggests that at some point in the future, a new security architecture for western Europe, inclusive of Russia, will come onto the table. How this plays out in terms of the sovereignty of member states remains to be seen.
The EU project began its life as a colonial project. It has sought to secure an autonomous geopolitical status, distinct from the United States and the other powers of the Eurasian continent; historically speaking the Soviet Union and more recently, Russia and China. Yet, as a geopolitical project, it has come up short. It is today more dependent on the U.S. than it has been for a long time, with limited capacity to exercise the much sought after ‘strategic sovereignty’. As an economic institution, the EU is also confronting pressures brought about by problems of delivery. Deindustrialisation is a reality. The structure of energy provisioning has undermined cost competitiveness and autonomy. Ambitions of a green transition are in tatters, without a reconciliation with the reality that the least cost, fastest route involves working with - and not against - China.
So, we are left to wonder:
Does an EU as it is configured today, with the orientation of its elites focused principally on Washington, make sense for individual member states?
Are the interests of the Washington-Brussels axis consistent with the interests of European nations and their peoples? Public opinion surveys show a growing divide and disquiet.
Can Europe achieve energy independence without greater collaboration with China, the world’s largest supplier of renewable energy technologies and infrastructure? If the EU can’t, what can individual member states do to enhance their own energy sovereignty and take advantage of green industrial development? Hungary and Serbia’s experiences point to new possibilities.
As the Eurasian continent continues to integrate economically and align its overarching security architecture via multilateral institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, do the EU member states see their future as the continental fag-end of transatlantic priorities or as the western bulwark of Eurasia?
Xi Jinping’s visit brings these questions into sharp relief.